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Abstract 
Innovations and technological developments have been recognized for their central importance for economic 
success and growth at least since the 1930s. Intellectual property (IP) and intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
such as patents, trade secret rights, and copyrights, have during more recent decades caught increasing 
attention, and, mainly due to various developments at macro level, IP has become an important source of 
competitive advantage at micro level in many industries. This has led to an increased importance of strategic 
IP management, and the related research field has been growing since the late 1990s. This thesis aims to 
contribute to this growing field, and the first purpose of this thesis is to explore and explain strategic and 
innovation related IP management practices, and the managerial and economic consequences of such 
practices. Apart from the growing importance of IP management in general, an increased focus on open and 
collaborative approaches for creating innovations has led to a need for new and adapted IP management 
skills. The second purpose of this thesis is therefore to develop managerial and economic frameworks, 
models, and tools to be used in the intersection between IP management and open innovation practices. 
These purposes are addressed in a cover paper and six appended research papers of theoretical/conceptual as 
well as of empirical nature, being based on interviews, questionnaires, patent statistics, and document 
studies. 
In connection to the first purpose the results show that, while many small firms have problems with properly 
benefitting from the patent system, large firms have increasingly developed their IP strategies, especially 
their patent strategies. The purpose is then not only to appropriate monopolistic returns from innovations but 
also to govern various forms of open innovation. Large firms were found to in a first step increase their 
patenting (in terms of quantity), and in a second step focus more on selective, quality-oriented, and 
internationalized patenting. Additional results show that the internationalization leads to a convergence in 
managerial choices of output markets for patenting worldwide, in parallel with market and technology 
diversification. Further, a case from mobile telecommunications illustrates the role of IP management in the 
governance of open innovation systems. Finally, two cases from the automotive industry illustrate the IP-
related problems that arise in connection to divestments and other types of disintegrations (‘IP disassembly 
problems’), and how IP management can mitigate them. 
This leads to the second purpose, related to the development of models, tools, and frameworks for IP 
management in relation to open innovation. First, the thesis provides a conceptual framework of innovation 
openness, especially pinpointing the role of IPRs. This framework emphasizes three key dimensions of 
innovation openness: resource distribution, technology governance, and technology accessibility. Second, a 
framework for managing the IP disassembly problem is presented, enabling increased exit opportunities and 
decreased transaction costs. Third, a method for determining fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
royalties in licensing collaborations is developed, applicable to multilateral licensing deals. 
It stands clear that contemporary IP management is not (and has never been) only about maximizing 
excludability. Strategic IP management must therefore be developed and integrated with technology and 
corporate management in order to foster success at the micro level of firms, and thereby also at macro level. 
Developments in IP management skills (e.g., sourcing, control, commercialization, licensing, valuation, 
pricing) and IP contracts will then most likely lead to increased efficiency of interorganizational 
technological relationships and quasi-integrated organizational forms, and thereby also to increased 
innovativeness and economic development. 
Keywords: Intellectual property right; open innovation; research and development; innovation economics; 
technology management; strategy; value appropriation; licensing; governance; theory of the firm 
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1 Introduction 
On August 24, 2012, a federal jury in San Jose, California, awarded Apple a one 
billion US dollar damage from Samsung, its main competitor in the smartphone 
industry, due to patent infringement. While Apple’s market value rose with 
roughly 15 billion US dollar after the verdict, the Samsung stock price dropped by 
7.5%, leading to a decrease in market value of twelve billion US dollar, probably 
partly due to the risk of an injunction in connection with the final ruling that was 
yet to come. The stock of another competitor, Nokia, rose by 6% after the 
decision, probably because Nokia’s smartphones used the Microsoft Windows 
mobile operating system. The Nokia/Windows ecosystem was expected to be less 
vulnerable to infringement accusations than Google’s Android operating system 
that was used by Samsung and many others. Expectations were therefore that 
Nokia would be able to catch some of the market shares that would be lost by 
Samsung in case of an injunction. Expectations were also that the Nokia/Windows 
ecosystem would grow in popularity among smartphone manufacturers, which in 
turn would attract application developers and thereby increase the popularity and 
utility of the ecosystem as a whole. 
The case above is only one out of several recent high level court cases illustrating 
the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) for firms and their success. These 
cases have been frequently reported in various news media during the early 2010s, 
and the importance of IPRs and intellectual property (IP) for technology-based 
businesses has thus been increasingly highlighted in recent years. However, these 
issues are not new. In the late 19th century Alexander Graham Bell’s patents were 
central to the success of his business in relation to competitors, although the 
Swedish telecommunications firm LM Ericsson’s initial success was actually 
enabled much due to the absence of a Swedish patent in Bell’s portfolio. In the 
emerging aircraft industry in the early 20th century the Wright brothers sued a 
number of competitors for infringing Wright’s patents for aircraft control, 
arguably curbing the US aircraft industry development to the extent that the US 
government eventually forced the industry to reach cross-licensing agreements in 
order not to fall too far behind European competitors.1 In the 1980s “patent wars” 
were frequently fought, for instance between Japanese and US firms in the 
electronics industry and between Procter & Gamble and Kimberly Clark in the 
diaper industry. 
Court cases and patent wars like the ones described above are useful examples of 
the importance of IP, as they provide instances where IP has major implications 
                                                 
 
1 See the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association. 
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for the success of firms. Only a small part of all IPRs are ever subject to court 
cases, however. This thesis studies strategic IP management more generally, with 
a focus on IP related to technological innovations. Strategic management of 
technological IP refers to formulating and executing strategies related to 
technological IP, including issues such as how to acquire and create IP, how to 
govern IP, and how to exploit and extract value from (commercialize) IP. 
A prerequisite for innovation related IP is the development of new innovations. 
Much research has highlighted the importance of innovations and technological 
developments for economic growth and welfare (e.g., Baumol, 2002; Rosenberg, 
1982; Rosenberg & Birdzell, 1986; Scherer, 1999; Schumpeter, 1934, 1942; 
Solow, 1956, 1957). Much research has also covered the area of technology and 
innovation management (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Chesbrough, 2003; Pavitt, 
1990; Teece, 2009; Trott, 2008; Utterback, 1994). The research area of IPRs has 
traditionally been treated within the disciplines of law and/or economics (e.g., 
Arrow, 1962; Domeij, 2003; Romer, 2002), while the research on innovation 
related IP management has traditionally been scarce (Granstrand, 1999; Hanel, 
2006). However, IP management research has been growing since the late 1990s 
(e.g., Granstrand, 1999; Pisano, 2006; Pisano & Teece, 2007; Reitzig, 2004; 
Somaya, 2012), much due to the macro level policy driven emergence of ‘pro-
patent eras’ with increasing patenting around the world (e.g., Granstrand, 1999; 
Hall, 2005; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Hu, 2010; Hu & Jefferson, 2009; Kortum & 
Lerner, 1998). This thesis contributes to the growing literature on IP management 
by its first purpose: to explore and explain strategic and innovation related 
intellectual property management practices, and the managerial and economic 
consequences of such practices. 
An important development during the 2000s, with implications for IP 
management, has been the growing practice and research of open innovation (e.g., 
Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Laursen & Salter, 2006), referring 
to innovation activities and processes that cross organizational boundaries. Such 
activities can include technology trade, licensing, collaborative research and 
development (R&D), crowdsourcing, acquisitions, divestments, etc. The practice 
of open innovation sets new requirements for strategic IP management. A 
common traditional assumption has been that IPRs should be used to maximize 
excludability (protection) of innovations in order to enable high returns from in-
house production and commercialization. Although that view is still valid under 
many conditions, it must be complemented with a more multifaceted portfolio of 
strategies and strategy combinations in order to align IP management with the 
general technology and innovation strategy, be it open or closed, in order to foster 
firm success. This thesis contributes to this area by its second purpose: to develop 
managerial and economic frameworks, models, and tools to be used in the 
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intersection between intellectual property management and open innovation 
practices. 
The thesis focuses on technical inventions and innovation related intellectual 
property, albeit in a non-exclusive way. This focus puts patents at the core, since 
patent systems are specifically designed to promote (technological) innovations 
by giving the owner of a patent the right to exclude others from commercially 
exploiting the patented invention. Further, the primary focus is on firm-level IP 
management, rather than national IPR policies and IPR systems. However, 
interdependencies between micro and macro levels must be taken into account 
when studying IP management, since national and international institutions (such 
as patent laws) govern the available set of strategic options for management. 
Therefore, implications are derived for both management and policy. 
This thesis consists of these cover chapters and six appended papers. The cover 
part is outlined as follows. The introductory chapter is followed by a frame of 
reference in chapter 2. The methodology and paper-specific purposes and research 
questions are motivated and described in chapter 3. This is followed by 
summaries of the appended papers in chapter 4. Some of the main results from the 
study are described in chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains a discussion of the results, 
and finally the main conclusions are summarized in chapter 7. 
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2 Frame of reference 
This frame of reference starts with a section in which a number of basic concepts 
needed throughout the thesis are defined, and continues with a section explaining 
the rationale of patent and IPR systems. Two important trends underlying this 
thesis are described in the subsequent section. These trends include the emergence 
of a pro-patent era, in which the importance of IP for management has grown, and 
the increased focus on open innovation, setting new requirements on IP 
management. After the description of these trends, three different theories of the 
firm are described. A section on appropriation strategies is then followed by a 
related section on strategic IP management. Finally, key research papers within 
the field are presented, as identified by a structured literature review. 
2.1 Basic concepts 
Innovations in general, including developments of useful technical knowledge 
(technology), i.e., technological innovations, are major factors behind economic 
developments (Baumol, 2002; Rosenberg, 1982; Rosenberg & Birdzell, 1986; 
Scherer, 1999; Schumpeter, 1934, 1942; Solow, 1956, 1957). An innovation is 
then commonly defined as something new that has come to some sort of use, a 
definition that makes a separation between invention and commercialization 
activities or processes (Freeman, 1982; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Granstrand, 
1999; Layton, 1977; March, 1991; Schumpeter, 1934). Granstrand (1999, p. 58) 
defines an innovation as a “change in ideas, practices or objects involving some 
degree of (i) novelty or creation based on human ingenuity and (ii) success in 
application”. An invention, in comparison, can be defined as a “first idea, sketch 
or contrivance of a new-to-the-world product, process or system, which may or 
may not be patented” (Freeman, 1982, p. 201). An invention is thus turned into an 
innovation when the invention comes to its first use (it is commercialized), for 
instance by being sold the first time (in the case of a product invention) or by 
being usefully applied in production (in the case of a process invention). 
Inventions and innovations should not be confused with the concept of 
discoveries, i.e., findings of pre-existing features of nature (Granstrand, 1999). 
This may, for example, be a law of nature. An invention differs from a discovery 
in that it is invented by man – hence not existent before being invented. An 
imitation is defined as a close reproduction, copy, or duplication of something 
once perceived as an invention (ibid.). Finally, the European Patent Office (EPO) 
defines (as of 2012) a patent as “a legal title granting its holder the right to 
prevent third parties from commercially exploiting an invention without 
authorization”. 
The main difference between discoveries on one hand and inventions and 
innovations on the other hand is that the latter two require an active agent that 
Innovation and intellectual property 
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“creates” the invention (innovation). These agents are here denoted inventors and 
innovators, and the latter concept is then a broader concept that can include 
commercializing agents besides inventing agents (inventors), as well as hybrids of 
inventors and commercializing agents (such as application developers). Inventors 
and innovators, respectively, can refer to individuals, firms, or other types of 
inventive and innovative agents, and are in this thesis used for denoting inventive 
and innovative agents in general, if not further specified. 
2.2 Patent and IPR systems for incentivizing innovation 
The fact that there are active agents involved in the innovation process implies 
that the stream of inventions and innovations that are created is dependent upon 
incentives for such agents to invent and innovate, typically in terms of returns 
from their efforts. Knowledge has characteristics of a(n) (impure) public good 
(Stiglitz, 1999), meaning that consumption by one actor does not restrict 
consumption by others (non-rival) and that it is difficult to exclude actors from 
using the good (non-excludable). The non-excludability leads to investors in 
R&D, technology, and innovation having problems with reaching positive returns 
on investments (ROIs): 
As we have seen, information is a commodity with peculiar attributes, particularly 
embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation. In the first place, any 
information obtained, say a new method of production, should, from the welfare 
point of view, be available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting 
information). This insures optimal utilization of the information but of course 
provides no incentive for investment in research. (Arrow, 1962, pp. 616-617) 
Profits from innovations are likely to end up with holders of complementary 
assets when imitation is easy, rather than with the inventing agent (Teece, 1986). 
Underinvestment in R&D and innovation then occurs due to this market failure 
(Arrow, 1962; Demsetz, 1967; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield et al., 1977). 
Considering the importance that technological developments have for economic 
developments and growth, states try to incentivize technology and innovation 
investments by various means. Patent systems are therefore constructed to make 
technical knowledge temporarily excludable, enabling innovators to appropriate 
returns from their investments and thereby incentivizing generation (and 
diffusion) of inventions. This is then a consequentialist, and more specifically 
utilitarian, justification of the patent system. By contrast, deontological 
justifications (based on moral rights/rules) of IPR systems include that one should 
have the right to reap benefits from one’s own labor and that one should have the 
rights related to one’s own personality or identity (Granstrand, 1999). 
Neoclassical economic theory in the footsteps of Marshall (1890) and others is 
commonly used to explain the utilitarian rationale of patent systems (e.g., 
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Granstrand, 1999, 2010; Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010; Scotchmer, 2004). The 
following is an explanation based on a product innovation: When a firm receives a 
patent on a product technology, the society as a whole makes a temporary welfare 
“loss” (deadweight loss) due to monopolistic pricing above the marginal cost 
(MC), while the firm can make a profit (enabling a positive ROI). This is a 
sacrifice made from society’s point of view in order to create incentives for 
potential inventors not only to invest in R&D in the first place, but also to disclose 
their inventions through patent publications. When the patent term ends or when 
substitute technologies are provided2 the price will fall closer to the MC, leading 
to increased welfare for society at large.3 To summarize, patent systems have two 
main purposes: 
1. To stimulate R&D and innovation investments. 
2. To stimulate knowledge disclosure.4 
A patent system is one, but not the only, way of incentivizing generation of 
technological innovations. Alternatives to a patent system, also tailored to 
incentivizing R&D investments (but not necessarily knowledge diffusion) and 
commonly used as complementary systems, include sales tax reductions and 
subsidies, innovation procurement contracts, R&D tax credits/deductions, 
innovation prizes, and R&D grants/subsidies (David, 1993; Granstrand, 2003; 
Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010; Scotchmer, 2004; Wright, 1983). The patent system 
has actually received a lot of critique for creating too high transaction costs and 
monopolistic over-pricing leading to welfare losses (Bessen & Meurer, 2008; 
Granstrand, 2011; Jaffe & Lerner, 2004; Machlup & Penrose, 1950), and some 
have even suggested to abolish the system. The consequences of abandoning the 
patent system are however very difficult to overlook, and the following quote 
from the 1950s to some extent pervades also contemporary views of the patent 
system:  
If one does not know whether a system “as a whole” (in contrast to certain features 
of it) is good or bad, the safest “policy conclusion” is to “muddle through” – either 
with it, if one has long lived with it, or without it, if one has lived without it. If we 
did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since 
                                                 
 
2  For instance after ‘inventing around’ activities by competitors being attracted by excess profits, 
as argued by Schumpeter (1942). 
3 Since products are typically based on more than one patented invention, and since there might be 
substitute products and inventions, reality is of course seldom as simple as this economic model. 
4 A national patent application is typically published 18 months after the filing (priority) date or 
when the patent is granted, whichever comes first. 
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we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis 
of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. (Machlup, 1958, p. 80) 
A number of more or less adjustable parameters are related to an IPR system at 
national level, and when managing the system the purpose is ultimately to spur 
dynamic competition while sacrificing as little static competition as possible. In 
addition, states commonly try to promote domestic interests (which does not 
necessarily comply with the promotion of competition). Parameters related to the 
design of an IPR system include: What should be protectable5; how long should it 
be protected; how strong should it be protected; where should it be protected; 
what should be the cost; etc. (e.g., Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990; 
Merges & Nelson, 1990). A general problem is then that various IPR systems are 
typically designed in a ‘one size fits all’ type of way (Thurow, 1997). This is 
problematic since various actors, intangibles, and technologies are impacted 
differently from the same IPR system. Technologies with short product life cycles 
(PLCs) and low investment levels have the same maximal protection time by 
patents as technologies with long PLCs and high investment levels. The latter 
typically needs longer market exclusivity to reach positive ROIs, whereby also a 
longer protection time would ideally be given, and vice versa.6 Further, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) have been shown to benefit differently from 
patent systems than large firms (Blind et al., 2006; de Rassenfosse, 2012; 
Leiponen & Byma, 2009).  
A national IPR system consists of a range of various IPRs, some of the most 
common being patent rights, trade secret rights, design rights, copyrights, and 
trademark rights (Koktvedgaard & Levin, 2004; Rockman, 2004; Spence, 2007). 
The availability and design of different types of rights vary across jurisdictions, 
however. This thesis focuses primarily on patents and to some extent trade secret 
rights and trademark rights. Three typical requirements for patentability of an 
invention are that it should (1) be novel, (2) be useful / be industrially applicable / 
have technical character (depending on jurisdiction), and (3) be non-obvious. 
Worth noting is that a patent in itself does not give the owner any freedom to use 
the invention commercially (freedom to operate).7 The patent does only give the 
                                                 
 
5 ‘Patentable subject matter’ in the case of the patent system. 
6 Some flexibility in terms of patent protection time is available in cases of pharmaceutical 
inventions subject to many years of trials before marketing due to government regulations.  
7 Consider a case in which a basic invention is patented by company A. Company B then improves 
the basic invention and patents this improvement. Then company B needs a license from company 
A on the basic invention patent before having the right to produce its product (based on both 
inventions). Securing such licenses and ensuring that there are no blocking patents is sometimes 
called ‘patent clearance’. 
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owner a right to prevent others from using the patented invention commercially, 
not a right for the owner to commercialize it him-/herself. Trade secret rights 
protect from misappropriation of valuable secrets that are not generally known. 
However, a trade secret does not protect from others inventing the same thing 
independently or from reverse engineering (in general). Hence, trade secrets are 
most suitable for secrets that are difficult to discover or reverse engineer (see 
section 2.5). Note also that patents and copyrights expire after a certain time8 
while there is no legally codified end to trade secret rights. Most IPRs only offer a 
national protection. If an invention is patented in Germany it offers only legal 
protection in Germany. This does not give the owner right to prevent others from 
commercializing the invention in, for example, France. Copyrights make an 
exception in that they commonly protect the owner internationally, at least in 
practice (Koktvedgaard & Levin, 2004). 
2.3 Two important trends for IP management 
This section will describe two important trends that have important implications 
for IP management. First, the emergence of a pro-patent era is described, 
including a brief description of the history of patent systems. During the pro-
patent era, the importance of IP for management has grown. Second, the 
phenomenon of open innovation is described, and the increased focus of open 
innovation leads to new requirements on IP management. 
2.3.1 Brief history and the emergence of a pro-patent era 
The history of patent-like rights goes back to at least the 14th century (Granstrand, 
1999) although what is often referred to as the first formal patent statute was 
adopted in Venice in 1474 (Guellec & Potterie, 2007). However, China’s first 
patent law came as late as in 1984 (Keupp et al., 2010) which can be compared to 
1623 in England, 1790 in the US, and 1819 in Sweden.  
In the early 1980s, legal changes in the US, including the establishment of the US 
Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit (CAFC) and the strengthening of 
enforcement of patent rights, led to what is sometimes referred to an explosion in 
patenting in the US (e.g., Hall, 2005) and the pro-patent era (Granstrand, 1999). 
Since then, US patenting has grown rapidly and large firms have increased their 
                                                 
 
8 The length of a copyright varies in different jurisdictions. In the US and in Sweden, for example, 
a copyright lasts for 70 years after the death of the creator of the copyrighted work. A patent 
typically lasts for 20 years after the filing of the application as long as the renewal fees are being 
paid. See also Greenhalgh and Rogers (2010) for a description of the length, breadth and coverage 
of various intellectual property rights. 
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patenting a lot, exemplified by the top ten patentees9 in Table 2.1. The pro-patent 
era has subsequently spread to large parts of the world, especially to Europe and 
Asia, and Asian firms (especially Japanese and Korean ones) in fact hold a large 
share of granted US patents. The worldwide patenting has also increased during 
the same period, albeit with a slightly slower pace, see Figure 2.1.  
In parallel with increased patenting, IPR systems around the world have evolved, 
and also converged. This development has been spurred by the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, and its 
enforcement through the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Maskus, 2000).10 
 
Table 2.1 Top ten patentees in terms of granted US utility patents in 1987, 2000, and 2011 
 1987 No.  2000 No.  2011 No.
1 Canon 847 1 IBM 2886 1 IBM 6148
2 Hitachi 845 2 NEC 2021 2 Samsung 4868
3 Toshiba 823 3 Canon 1890 3 Canon 2818
4 General Electric 779 4 Samsung 1441 4 Panasonic 2533
5 US Philips 687 5 Lucent 1411 5 Toshiba 2451
6 Westinghouse 652 6 Sony 1385 6 Microsoft 2309
7 IBM 591 7 Micron Technology 1304 7 Sony 2265
8 Siemens 539 8 Toshiba 1232 8 Seiko Epson 1525
9 Mitsubishi Electric 518 9 Motorola 1196 9 Hitachi 1455
10 RCA 504 10 Fujitsu 1147 10 GE 1444
 Total: 6785  Total: 15913  Total: 27816
Source: Statistics from USPTO for year 2000 and 2011, and Granstrand (1999) for year 1987 
 
                                                 
 
9 The concept ‘patentee’ denotes the patent applicant, while ‘patentor’ is the person or actor 
granting the patent. Similarly ‘licensee’ denotes a license buyer, while the ‘licensor’ is the license 
seller. 
10 See also Wallerstein et al. (1993) for a discussion on harmonization and differentiation of IPR 
systems. 
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Source: Statistics from WIPO 
Figure 2.1 Total number of patent applications worldwide per year, 1985-2010 
 
The growth in patenting indicates an increasing importance of IP. Granstrand 
(1999, 2000) elaborates upon the notion of intellectual capitalism, a form of 
capitalism where the traditional dependence upon fixed assets is increasingly 
replaced with dependence upon intellectual capital (IC) and intangible11 assets, 
such as knowledge, competence, patents, trademarks, etc. Intellectual capital then 
“comprises all immaterial resources that could be considered as assets with some 
kind of assignable capitalized value” (Granstrand, 1999, p. 18).12 Intellectual 
capital is typically divided into three different types (e.g., Bontis, 2002; 
Edvinsson, 1997; Lev, 2001; Marr & Adams, 2004; McConnachie, 1997; Roos et 
al., 1997; Sveiby, 1997); human capital (knowledge, skills, experience, etc., 
related to specific employees), structural capital (organization, management, 
attitudes, R&D, software, etc.), and relational capital (relationships with all 
different stakeholders, including customers and suppliers). It is difficult to account 
for the values of intellectual property, assets, capital, etc., however, since there are 
no exchange values related to them (Hall, 1989). Nevertheless, attempts to value 
                                                 
 
11 Note that the word intellectual is commonly exchanged with intangible or immaterial. The 
concept ‘intangibles’ is for instance often used with the same meaning as intellectual or immaterial 
assets. 
12 Note however that the concepts intellectual property, intellectual capital, intellectual assets, and 
intellectual property rights have not yet been fully established and homogenously defined in 
academia and practice (Marr & Adams, 2004). 
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IPRs are frequently made, as illustrated by Interbrand’s valuation of top 
trademarks (see Table 2.2). IPR value distributions are extremely skewed 
(Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw et al., 1996; Scherer, 1999). In fact, patent value 
distributions are so skewed that an infinite variance cannot be ruled out. This 
means firstly that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) cannot be unreservedly 
used when valuing patent assets (Granstrand, 2003), and secondly that portfolio 
strategies do not guarantee that average values will reach a stable mean (Scherer, 
1999). In general, patents and other IPRs are very difficult to value, even ex post, 
due to the difficulty in assessing the related cash flows.13 
 
Table 2.2 The world’s most highly valued trademarks 
2009 Rank Trademark 2009 Value (BUSD) 
 2007 Rank 2007 Value (BUSD) 
 2001 Rank 2001 Value (BUSD) 
1 Coca-Cola 68.7 1 65.3 1 68.9 
2 IBM 60.2 3 57.1 3 52.8 
3 Microsoft 56.6 2 58.7 2 65.1 
4 GE 47.8 4 51.6 4 42.4 
5 Nokia 34.9 5 33.7 5 35.0 
6 McDonald’s 32.3 8 29.4 9 25.3 
7 Google 32.0 20 17.8 >100 - 
8 Toyota 31.3 6 32.1 14 18.6 
Source: Interbrand (2009) 
 
A number of measures have been used by various scholars to point at the 
increasing relative value of intellectual capital, although few of them actually 
provide any clear evidence if scrutinized.14 The fact that the share of people’s 
                                                 
 
13 See Copeland et al. (2005) and Damodaran (2002) for general valuation principles and Mun 
(2006) for a real options approach in valuing patents and other assets. 
14 Many of the measures of increasing importance of IP and intellectual capitalism that have been 
used can be questioned. First, looking at increased patenting, the worldwide increase to a large 
extent stems from increases in patenting in the United States and various countries in Asia, such as 
Japan, Korea, India and China (see Figure 2.2). Since the rise in Asia might be due to general 
catching-up effects (e.g., Abramovitz, 1986) this does not provide proof of increasing intellectual 
capitalism. Additionally, the industrialization of the world has increased during the same period, 
which affects the statistics of patent applications. Industrialization in itself is of course related to 
intellectual capitalism, however.  
Second, the value of trademarks is sometimes used as a measure. The sum of the values of the 
eight most highly valued trademarks in 1992 was 132.6 BUSD (Granstrand, 1999), while the sum 
of the values of the eight most highly valued trademarks in 2009 (which is another set of 
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lives spent on education and learning increases and that the intensity of 
knowledge and information in products and services rises (Granstrand, 1999) still 
indicate that society is becoming increasingly knowledge-based, however.  
Looking at the development of national patent frequency in various countries it is 
clear that the developments since the rise of the pro-patent era vary across 
countries (see Figure 2.2).  While national patenting has been increasing in the US 
and in Asia, it has been decreasing in a number of small industrialized European 
countries, exemplified by Sweden and some other similar small countries in 
Figure 2.2. In this connection it is important to note that there are a number of 
different routes to take when applying for a patent, and statistics must therefore be 
treated with care.  
Swedish patentees (patent applicants) can file patent applications not only to the 
Swedish patent and trademark office (PTO), but also to any other national PTO, to 
the European Patent Office (EPO), or in the international Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) system.15 Therefore, the decline in Swedish national patenting does 
not imply a decreased inventive output in Sweden, but could just as well indicate 
                                                                                                                                     
 
trademarks) was 363.8 BUSD (Interbrand, 2009). This corresponds to an increase in trademark 
values of 174% from 1992 to 2009 in nominal terms. Since the most highly valued trademarks are 
mainly owned by US companies, the value growth can be compared to the increase in GDP for the 
US from 1992 to 2007 which was 229% in nominal terms (based on OECD Statistics, 2009). 
Hence, the growth in trademark values has been lower than the growth of GDP in the US. At the 
same time, comparing growth in trademark values with GDP growth as an indication of 
intellectual capitalism is misleading, since much of the GDP growth might be driven by 
intellectual capital and knowledge and this measure might therefore underestimate intellectual 
capitalism. Nevertheless, the fact that the GDP of the US grows faster than the top values of 
trademarks could, if anything, be seen as an indicator of decreased intellectual capitalism, or more 
specifically decreased relative importance of trademarks. 
Third, some scholars compare market values of companies with low numbers of employees (e.g., 
Google) with market values of companies with high numbers of employees (e.g., Ford) to show 
that the relative value of intellectual capital in the world has risen since companies with only few 
employees nowadays can outcompete very large organizations in terms of market values. 
However, such a comparison is also misleading since human capital is an important part of 
intellectual capital.  
Fourth, the market to book-ratio, i.e., Tobin’s q, can be used, which indicate the relation between a 
company’s market value and the booked value of its assets. Still, the development of Tobin’s q 
over time shows no clear evidence for increased levels of intellectual capital (despite the all-time 
high around year 2000). Part of the reason for this might be more liberal accounting with 
companies beginning to book more and more intangible assets, leading to a decreased Tobin’s q. 
15 The PCT system allows an applicant to file a single application in one language and get an 
international priority date. That priority date is then valid in all PCT contracting states, meaning 
that one single patent application is enough to file for patent protection in all contracting states 
(more than 140). However, for the application to proceed to a valid patent, a number of actions 
need to be taken, typically including translation work and national patent applications. 
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a strategic change among its inventing actors, impacting the propensity to patent 
patentable inventions/innovations.  
Apart from cross-country variations, patent propensities vary across industries 
(Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Mansfield, 1986; 
Scherer, 1983). Further, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) have lower 
propensities to patent than large firms (Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & 
Kleinknecht, 1999; Chabchoub & Niosi, 2005; Mansfield, 1986), while they have 
(had) higher patent per R&D ratios than large firms (Bound et al., 1984).16 In 
addition, firms with R&D collaboration agreements have been found to be more 
likely to patent than others (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999). A conclusion is that 
patents help formalizing R&D collaborations and that they have an important role 
in the governance of open innovation. 
 
 
Source: Statistics from WIPO and national PTOs 
Figure 2.2 National patent applications in selected countries per year, 1985-2008 
                                                 
 
16 An important fact here is however that innovation activities in SMEs are underestimated when 
measured by R&D statistics while innovation activities in large firms are underestimated when 
measured by patent statistics (Pavitt, 1982). 
0
50 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
300 000
350 000
400 000
450 000
500 000
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
C
hi
na
, I
nd
ia
, J
ap
an
, K
or
ea
, U
S
Fi
nl
an
d,
 S
w
ed
en
, S
w
itz
er
la
nd
Finland
Sweden
Switzerland
China
India
Japan
Korea
USA
Frame of reference 
15 
2.3.2 Open innovation 
The concept of open innovation was introduced in 2003 by Chesbrough, defining 
it as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well 
as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as firms look to 
advance their technology” (Chesbrough, 2003, p. XXIV). However, open 
innovation-like practices had been identified by both practitioners and researchers 
much earlier (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Gemünden et al., 1992; Granstrand, 
1982; Granstrand & Sjölander, 1990; Trott & Hartmann, 2009; von Hippel, 1988, 
2005) using other terms, such as technology acquisition (sourcing) and 
exploitation (commercialization). Since the establishment of the concept in 2003, 
an increasing amount of academic research has stressed the possibilities for firms 
to increase innovativeness and competitiveness through the use of inbound open 
innovation by relying upon external sources of knowledge and outbound open 
innovation by relying upon external paths to markets (Chesbrough & Crowther, 
2006; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Enkel et al., 2009; Laursen & Salter, 2006; van 
de Vrande et al., 2009). In addition, a coupled mode of open innovation has been 
recognized (Enkel et al., 2009), in which knowledge is developed and 
commercialized jointly with external partners, for instance through innovation 
alliances and networks (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Dittrich & Duysters, 2007; 
Mowery et al., 1996). A related stream of literature has instead focused on 
openness in terms of the public good nature (non-rivalry and non-excludability) of 
innovations and knowledge (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; O'Mahony, 2003; von 
Hippel, 1988, 2005; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003).  
There are different potential benefits of employing some form of openness in 
innovation. One main advantage for a firm employing an open innovation strategy 
is that the firm can access outside resources, including skilled researchers and 
engineers (Chesbrough, 2003). Additionally, by adopting various forms of 
openness firms can avoid duplicate R&D work by allowing technology trade, 
enabling both lowered R&D costs (for the acquirer) and increased revenues from 
technology sales (for the seller). This could potentially also enable benefits from 
economies of scale in in-house R&D, while at the same time enabling economies 
of scope across firm boundaries by cross-fertilization of technologies developed 
by different firms. Empirical research has confirmed that there are benefits with 
employing some level of openness in innovation (Gemünden et al., 1992; Laursen 
& Salter, 2006).  
Technology-sharing across firm boundaries comes with requirements, however, 
both in terms of internal technological capabilities and absorptive capacity, i.e., 
the ability to recognize, assimilate and apply external knowledge commercially 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and in terms of network competence, i.e., the “ability 
to handle, use, and exploit interorganizational relationships” (Ritter & Gemünden, 
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2003, p. 745), and it is clear that more open is not always better (Laursen & 
Salter, 2006). Empirical studies have rather shown that there are 
complementarities between open and closed forms of innovation (e.g., Cassiman 
& Veugelers, 2006; Faems et al., 2010; West & Gallagher, 2006). 
There are different possible explanations for why various forms of open 
innovation have possibly increased, and a few of them will be mentioned here. 
First, due to increased R&D costs and decreased profits from product sales 
(typically due to shorter PLCs) it is increasingly difficult to obtain an acceptable 
ROI from innovation investments (Chesbrough, 2007). Increased R&D costs are 
partly results of companies (and products) becoming increasingly technologically 
diversified (Granstrand & Oskarsson, 1994; Granstrand et al., 1997; Kodama, 
1986; Pavitt et al., 1989). As the diversification increases, the costs of R&D 
increase (Granstrand & Oskarsson, 1994). Granstrand (1998) suggests that this 
partly has to do with the coordination and integration work necessary when 
incorporating multiple technologies in the firm, and Granstrand and Oskarsson 
(1994) specifically argue for the importance of utilizing external technology 
acquisition in increasingly technologically diversified firms. By partially relying 
upon external technology sourcing firms can lower costs for acquiring necessary 
technologies (Chesbrough, 2007). Second, technological developments, for 
example in information and communication technologies (ICTs), have decreased 
market transaction costs (but probably also management costs), possibly 
improving the relative efficiency of market-like transactions (Coase, 1988; 
Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Williamson, 1975) and thereby enabling the use of 
various forms of open innovation. Third, the increased use of patents in the pro-
patent era combined with demands for diversified technologies increase the 
likelihood that firms encounter problems to ensure freedom to operate. Before 
commercially using a technology, firms must collect all necessary IPRs to ensure 
freedom to operate (Granstrand, 1999; Granstrand & Oskarsson, 1994; Somaya et 
al., 2011). The problem of collecting all necessary rights is sometimes called the 
IP assembly problem (Granstrand, 1999, 2010). This problem can then be 
mitigated by various forms of open innovation, including licensing deals, mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As), integration through joint ventures (JVs), etc. Hence, 
patents and other IPRs not only create the IP assembly problem, they are also part 
of the solution by enabling technology and knowledge trade (Arora, 1997; Arora 
et al., 2001; Bogers et al., 2012; Davis, 2008; Granstrand, 2004; Lichtenthaler, 
2010). Without IPRs knowledge trade would likely be hampered due to the nature 
of information, which needs to be revealed for the buyer before traded, and after 
having been revealed a potential buyer has no longer any need to pay for the 
information (Arrow, 1962). This is often referred to as the information paradox. 
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2.4 Theories of the firm 
The most basic and fundamental question to be explained by theories of the firm 
is: Why do firms exist? This question is also related to the boundaries of firms, or 
more generally the level of integration among economic agents, as well as to 
strategic management, since it typically deals with efficiencies of alternative ways 
of organizing economic activity. Different theoretical streams of literature have 
been developed in order to provide explanations, and three streams are especially 
useful for the purpose of this thesis; transaction cost theory (TCT), property 
rights theory (PRT), and resource-based theory (RBT). These provide different 
perspectives, and multiple authors have emphasized complementarities rather than 
rivalry among alternative theories of the firm (e.g., Granstrand, 1998; Jacobides & 
Winter, 2005; Williamson, 1985). 
2.4.1 Transaction cost theory 
TCT, as pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996), uses 
transactions as the unit of analysis, and emphasizes the importance of transaction 
costs for economic organization. TCT argues that the main reason for organizing 
economic activity within a firm is that there are costs associated with organizing 
economic activity on a market (Coase, 1988). Such costs can be divided into ex 
ante transaction costs, including costs for drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding 
agreements, and ex post transaction costs, including costs for maladaptation, 
haggling, dispute governance, and bonding (Williamson, 1985). Coase (1937) 
summarizes the basics of TCT:  
We may sum up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a 
market costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some 
authority (an “entrepreneur”) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are 
saved. (Coase, 1937, p. 392) 
Williamson (1975) also distinguishes between transactions on the market and 
within the hierarchy (within the integrated firm). Like Coase, Williamson thereby 
sees markets and firms as “alternative instruments for completing a related set of 
transactions” and further that “whether a set of transactions ought to be executed 
across markets or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency of each mode” 
(Williamson, 1975, p. 8). Six important concepts related to TCT are bounded 
rationality, opportunism, small-numbers, information impactedness, asset 
specificity, and atmosphere (a seventh one, incomplete contracting, is described 
below in connection to PRT). First, TCT assumes bounded rationality, i.e., that 
behavior is intendedly rational, but only limitedly so (Simon, 1947), and 
opportunism, i.e., self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975). 
Opportunism is enabled by incomplete contracting (see below), and includes “ex 
ante adverse selection (hidden information), ex post moral hazard (hidden action), 
and hold-up problems” (Mahoney, 2005, p. 75). Opportunism creates larger 
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problems with small-numbers conditions than with large-numbers conditions, 
since multiple competitive exchange relations mitigate opportunistic behavior. 
However, large-numbers conditions may evolve into small-numbers conditions, 
for instance due to first-mover advantages or asset specificities (see below). 
Information impactedness exists when “true underlying circumstances relevant to 
the transaction, or related set of transactions, are known to one or more parties but 
cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others” (Williamson, 1975, p. 
31). Both information impactedness and opportunism can be mediated by internal 
management, incentivizing organizational integration rather than market 
transactions. Asset specificity is a concept which refers to investments in assets 
(sites, physical assets, human assets, and dedicated assets) to support a specific 
transaction (Williamson, 1983, 1985). Asset specificity leads to parties being tied 
to a specific transaction and each other, further spurring small-numbers conditions 
and opportunism, possibly incentivizing organizational integration. The concept 
of atmosphere, finally, refers to preferences related to different modes of 
transaction. For example, many people find giving something away for free is 
rewarding, and some people also receive greater satisfaction from being self-
employed than doing the same work as an employee in a large corporation. Such 
preferences thus impact the choice of transaction mode (Williamson, 1975).  
2.4.2 Property rights theory 
PRT, being closely related to TCT, emphasizes the importance of (private) 
property rights in economic organization, especially when dealing with 
externalities (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Hart, 
1995; North, 1990). Three types of rights related to properties are usually 
distinguished; the right to use and transform a resource, the right to earn income 
from a resource, and the right to transfer ownership of the resource (Eggertsson, 
1990). This distinction of different types of rights is important in IP management, 
since a licensing deal might, for example, give the licensee (license buyer) the 
right to use and profit from a technology, while the right to transfer ownership is 
left with the licensor (license seller). Early advocators of PRT were optimistic in 
their views of how private property rights could enable efficient economic 
organization. The work by Coase (1960) showed that without transaction costs 
and with freely transferable property rights, negotiation between economic agents 
leads to efficient outcomes regardless of how property rights are allocated 
initially, as long as private property rights are defined. However, three problems 
with property rights hamper such economic efficiency. First, it is costly to enforce 
the rights (North, 1990). Second, it is costly to transfer the rights (ibid.). Third, 
due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) contingent claim contracting is costly 
and incomplete/imperfect (Coase, 1988; Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1985, 1996), 
leaving unknown residual rights. Thus, contracting parties risk to face costly 
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renegotiations ex post, a risk that most likely lowers the willingness to make ex 
ante relationship specific investments that could otherwise have improved 
economic efficiency (Hart, 1995). The state holds an important function here in 
mitigating such problems and limiting exchange costs by enforcing contracts in a 
predictable manner (Eggertsson, 1990). The problems can also be mitigated by 
organizational integration, which implies that the boundaries of the firm are 
interdependent with economic efficiency (Hart, 1995). If the problems are 
relatively costly, boundaries are likely to expand, while if internal management is 
relatively costly, boundaries are likely to contract. 
Two additional problems for economic organization related to PRT should be 
mentioned here. The first problem is the tragedy of the commons. Hardin (1968) 
showed that scarce common goods, having characteristics or rivalry and non-
excludability, can be subject to overuse if multiple individuals act opportunistic 
and individually. By defining private property rights, common goods can be 
transformed into private goods, mitigating the tragedy of the commons problem. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates a common typology over different types of goods, including 
common and private goods, based on the characteristics of rivalry in consumption 
and excludability.17 The second problem is the tragedy of the anticommons. Heller 
(1998) showed that a resource can be subject to underuse if there are multiple 
exclusion rights related to the resource distributed across multiple agents (it is an 
“anticommons good”) (see also Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Such underuse can, 
for example, arise due to hold-up problems in cases where multiple patents related 
to a single product or process are owned by different agents (Lemley & Shapiro, 
2007). To summarize, economic problems can arise due to both excludability and 
non-excludability characteristics, and IP management deals with both types of 
problems. 
Returning to the typology of different types of goods in Figure 2.3, the concept of 
public goods, being non-rivalrous and non-excludable, traces back to Samuelson 
(1954). Besides these characteristics, public goods (and knowledge) are typically 
subject to “low marginal cost of reproduction and distribution (which makes it 
difficult to exclude others from access), and substantial fixed costs of original 
production” (David, 1993, p. 27). Further, knowledge can be viewed as an impure 
public good (Stiglitz, 1999). While the “consumption” and use of knowledge is 
non-rivalrous and can be undertaken at zero marginal cost, knowledge is far from 
completely non-excludable. One part of the impurity is a result from an inherent 
                                                 
 
17 Another important distinction of different types of goods is based on the cross-elasticity of 
demand between two goods. If the cross-elasticity of demand is positive, the goods are 
complementary, while if it is negative, the goods are substitutes. 
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characteristic of knowledge and human behavior – to keep some knowledge secret 
for various reasons. This can also include technological means of secrecy, such as 
encryption technologies. Controllability by such means is however lost when 
knowledge is disclosed. Another part of the impurity is created by states, by 
enabling excludability by patent systems and other IPR systems. Hence, property 
rights, and more specifically IPRs, are part of what differentiates knowledge as an 
impure public good from more general public goods. This is important, since 
while consumption of knowledge can be undertaken at zero marginal cost, the 
production (creation/invention) of knowledge is often costly, and possibilities to 
appropriate value from knowledge investments are necessary to incentivize such 
investments. This will be further described in section 2.5.  
 
  Excludability of a good means that it is 
possible to exclude individuals from 
consuming the good. 
 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rivalrous consumption means 
that the consumption of one 
individual detracts consumption 
of another individual. 
Rivalrous Private goods Common goods 
Non-rivalrous Club goods Public goods 
Figure 2.3 A typology of different types of goods 
 
Now, a definition of properties in relation to resources should be made before 
moving from PRT to RBT. In this thesis, properties are defined as resources with 
some form of assigned ownership. Since there might be multiple rights related to a 
property, as described above, and these rights can be contracted to different 
parties, a general definition of ownership is that the owner of a resource is the 
holder of the residual rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986). Thus, the owner of a 
property is defined as the holder of the residual rights related to the property, 
while a property is a resource with de jure or de facto assigned ownership. An 
intellectual property (IP) is then a property of immaterial character (although it 
can have material representations in form of, for example, blueprints, prototypes, 
or products). Following this reasoning, the concept of intellectual property 
incorporates not only intellectual resources controlled by legal ownership, but also 
intellectual resources controlled by other means, for instance control of 
complementary resources. To be precise, intellectual properties are in fact often 
not controlled by legal ownership of the resources themselves (e.g., a technology), 
but rather by ownership of legal rights related to the properties (e.g., a patent). 
Thus, the concept of IPRs will be distinguished from the concept of IP (see also 
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Granstrand, 1999). IP will be used as a broad concept for intangible resources 
with ownership assigned to them, while IPRs are the legal rights related to such 
resources (while at the same time constituting specific IP). To exemplify, a 
portfolio of IP can consist of a technology and the patent right related to that 
technology. Both the technology and the patent right constitute the IP, but only 
the patent right is an IPR. 
2.4.3 Resource-based theory 
RBT uses resources as the central unit of analysis. Penrose (1959) argues that a 
firm consists of productive resources being administered in order to render 
services useful to the firm. The combination and synergies of material resources 
and human resources enable unique services, leading to competitiveness of firms 
(Chandler, 1990; Penrose, 1959). Being more concerned with growth than size of 
firms, Penrose (1959) argues that unused resources (at least partly) direct the 
expansion of firms, while available managerial resources limit the growth. 
Itami and Roehl (1987) emphasize the role of “invisible assets” (resources), such 
as experience, information, technologies, brands, reputation, and culture, for firm 
competitiveness. Such invisible resources require time, money, and conscious 
efforts to build, and are often impossible to acquire “off the shelf” [although 
mergers and acquisitions can provide opportunities for such trade, as argued by 
Wernerfelt (1984)]. Due to the difficulties in building and trading them, invisible 
(or intellectual) resources are an important source of differentiation and 
sustainable competitive advantage, and controlling environmental, corporate, and 
internal information flows is central for successfully building invisible resources 
(Itami & Roehl, 1987).  
Barney defines [after critique from Priem and Butler (2001)] resources as “the 
tangible and intangible assets a firm uses to choose and implement its strategies” 
(Barney, 2001, p. 54). A competitive advantage exists when a value creating 
strategy is implemented by a firm without “simultaneously being implemented by 
any current or potential competitors” (Barney, 1991, p. 102). A sustained 
competitive advantage is then a competitive advantage that the current or potential 
competitors are unable to duplicate (Barney, 1991). The competitive implications 
of a resource can be assessed by the VRIO framework, analyzing the resource’s 
value, rareness, cost to imitate, and exploitability by the organization (Barney, 
1991; Barney & Hesterly, 2005). Strategic IP management clearly has an 
important role to play for firm competitiveness, since IP impacts all four parts (V, 
R, I, and O) of this framework. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) emphasize the role of core competences in firm 
competitiveness, while Granstrand et al. (1997) emphasize the importance of 
having distributed technological competences. Much like Itami and Roehl (1987) 
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the long-term efforts needed to build core competences are emphasized by 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990). Core competences should then be difficult to imitate, 
and the strategic use of IPRs has a role to play, although the “comprehensive 
pattern of internal coordination and learning” is what the original authors 
emphasize as the main source of inimitability (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p. 84). 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990, p. 81) further argue that the “real sources of advantage 
are to be found in management’s ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies 
and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to 
adapt quickly to changing opportunities”.  
This statement relates to the concept of dynamic capabilities, being defined as 
“the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 
516). Teece et al. (1997) make a distinction between replication and imitation. 
Replication “involves transferring or redeploying competences from one concrete 
economic setting to another” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 525) while imitation is 
“replication performed by a competitor” (p. 526). Teece et al. (1997) argue that 
although replication is often difficult due to the complexity of the resources and 
capabilities (see also Lippman & Rumelt, 1992; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), not the 
least due to the tacit nature of many organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 
1982), IPRs provide an additional barrier for imitators. Competitive advantage is 
only generated by competences difficult to imitate, and IPRs are of increasing 
importance for limiting imitation (Teece et al., 1997) and therefore central for 
competitive advantage. 
The latter points relate to ability of firms to capture (appropriate) value (see also 
section 2.5), which is typically also of most interest for IP management. However, 
the ability to create value is equally important for firms. Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) 
argues that “strategy for a bigger firm involves striking a balance between the 
exploitation of existing resources and the development of new ones”. Value can 
then be created by developing new resources, by using old resources in new ways, 
or by combining resources in new ways (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999; Penrose, 1959; 
Porter, 1985; Schumpeter, 1934). Although value creation is typically not of 
central focus for IP management, the latter does actually impact the former. This 
will be further discussed in section 2.6. 
2.4.4 Firms, hybrids, and markets 
The second purpose of this thesis relates to IP management in open innovation. As 
described above, open innovation refers to innovation activities and processes that 
cross organizational boundaries, and the separation between hierarchies (firms) 
and markets it thus central. 
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The three above described theories of the firm, especially PRT and TCT, provide 
different but complementary explanations of firm existence. PRT define the firm 
as being composed of the resources it owns (Grossman & Hart, 1986), and 
emphasize that ownership of economically relevant nonhuman resources are what 
gives the employer authority in an employer-employee relationship in comparison 
with an independent contracting relationship. Authority is then a central 
difference between economic activity within a firm and on a market (Simon, 
1947). Early advocators of PRT argued that nonseparabilities of working tasks 
(i.e., that multiple individuals are needed to perform a joint task) are an important 
reason for the creation of firms (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Complex diversified 
firms as described by Chandler (1962) cannot be explained by nonseparabilities, 
however (Williamson, 1975). Instead, TCT argues that firms are used to achieve 
collective action when the use of market prices fails (Arrow, 1974), for instance 
due to information impactedness, asset specificity, uncertain contracting, and job-
specific learning and skills (Williamson, 1975). Modern PRT argues that firm size 
depends on optimal allocation of property rights, considering incompleteness in 
contracting and transaction costs (Hart, 1995), although diminishing returns to 
management need to be taken into account (Coase, 1988). RBT distinguishes 
between the firm and the market in that the “essential difference between 
economic activity inside the firm and economic activity in the ‘market’ is that the 
former is carried on within an administrative organization, while the latter is not” 
(Penrose, 1959, p. 13), and identifies the ambiguity of the concept of a firm:  
A ‘firm’ is by no means an unambiguous clear-cut entity; it is not an observable 
object physically separable from other objects, and it is difficult to define except 
with reference to what it does or what is done within it. (Penrose, 1959, p. 9) 
The concept of the firm developed above does not depend on the ramification of 
stock ownership or the mere existence of the power to control […] On the other 
hand, long-term contracts, leases, and patent license agreements may give an 
equally effective control […] If a corporation is controlled by […] a larger 
corporation, it is part of the larger firm only if there is evidence of an 
administrative co-ordination of the two corporations […] Thus, although many 
industrial firms are more or less loosely bound together by a common source of 
finance or a strong element of common ownership, the mere existence of such 
connections is not of itself sufficient evidence that administrative co-ordination is 
effective and adequate enough to justify calling such a grouping a firm. (Penrose, 
1959, pp. 18-19) 
The distinction between a firm and a market is thus not clear-cut, and there are 
various degrees of hierarchy (Williamson, 1985). There are also different forms of 
internal organizations, such as matrix or multidivisional structures (Williamson, 
1975), with varying applicability to different situations. In addition, markets are 
institutions that can be designed in different ways to mitigate transaction costs to 
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variable extent (Coase, 1988). Thus, the choice between markets and hierarchies 
is not a binary one; there are multiple types of hierarchies and multiple types of 
markets, and in addition multiple types of hybrids in between (Williamson, 1991). 
One example of a hybrid is long-term continuous relationships between buyers 
and sellers (e.g., Ford et al., 1998; Gadde & Håkansson, 2001). Granstrand (1982) 
then argues that quasi-integrated forms of organizations (hybrids) are most 
conducive to technological innovation and that they will therefore become more 
common as a result of market and organization failures and managerial and 
technological innovations. This argument then anticipates the concept of open 
innovation, as described above. 
2.5 Innovation appropriation strategies 
Innovation activities aim to create something new and useful. However, most 
innovators are not only concerned with value creation, but also with capturing a 
share of that value. The ability to capture returns from R&D investments is 
commonly called appropriability (Levin et al., 1987; Teece, 1986). The 
appropriability regime is related not only to legal impediments (patents, 
copyrights, etc.) but also to the nature of the technology (product/process, 
tacit/codified) (Teece, 1986, 2006). In case of a “tight” appropriability regime 
(meaning that imitation is difficult or impossible, for instance due to a perfect 
patent), the innovator will likely collect a large share of profits from innovation. 
By contrast, when imitation is easy, access to complementary assets is central to 
capture returns from innovation (Teece, 1986). Teece (1986) early argued that 
tight appropriability regimes are rare, and that controlling complementary assets is 
therefore at core for innovators to appropriate returns from innovation. However, 
Teece as well as others have subsequently identified that appropriability is not 
exogenously given in an industry, but can be endogenously shaped by firms, 
governments, and technological change (Granstrand, 1999; Pisano, 2006; Pisano 
& Teece, 2007; Somaya, 2012; Teece, 2006). However, subsequent works have 
emphasized that tight appropriability regimes are not necessarily always most 
conducive for firm profitability (Dahlander & Wallin, 2006; Pisano, 2006), 
especially in industries where innovation is cumulative and complementary 
(David, 1993; Teece, 2009). 
The fact that the appropriability can be endogenously shaped means that 
appropriation strategies are important for enabling firms to capture returns from 
their innovation investments. A number of empirical studies have studied the 
relative effectiveness and importance of various means and strategies of 
protecting the competitiveness of new products and processes. Similarly as for 
patent propensity (see section 2.3.1), the effectiveness of different means varies 
widely across industries. Patents are typically more effective for product 
innovations than for process innovations (Granstrand, 1999; Levin et al., 1987). 
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However, patents have been shown to be one of the least effective means for 
appropriation in numerous studies (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Cohen et al., 
2000; Granstrand, 1999; Harabi, 1995; Kitching & Blackburn, 1998; Leiponen & 
Byma, 2009; Levin et al., 1987). Instead, firms typically rate informal means of 
appropriation more effective, such as sales or service efforts, market lead times, 
learning and cost reductions, secrecy, and switching costs. The only exception is 
found among Japanese firms, where patents have been rated the most effective 
means (Granstrand, 1999). In this connection it is important to note that various 
appropriation means are not mutually exclusive, as is, at least implicitly, assumed 
in some of the abovementioned studies. Market lead time, which is one 
appropriation strategy commonly studied, can for example be prolonged by both 
patent and trade secrecy protection. In addition, various means are complements 
rather than substitutes. A product innovation can typically be protected by both 
process secrecies and product patents, as well as by learning effects in production, 
marketing, superior after sales services, etc. 
The relatively low effectiveness of patents for appropriation can be related to 
some of the drawbacks with patenting. The main perceived drawbacks are the 
possibilities for competitors to legally invent around patents (illustrating the 
rareness of tight appropriability regimes, despite patent protection) and the 
information disclosure related to patenting (Harabi, 1995; Levin et al., 1987), as 
well as the high economic and non-economic costs of patenting (Cohen et al., 
2000; Kitching & Blackburn, 1998). Despite these drawbacks and the perceived 
relative low effectiveness of patents, firms seem to make use of them frequently. 
In some industries where patents were rated unimportant, roughly 60% of 
patentable inventions were nevertheless patented (Mansfield, 1986).18 This is 
sometimes referred to as the patenting paradox, leading to the question: Why do 
firms patent?  
This question has rendered a number of studies. Despite the fact that patents have 
been shown to have little effectiveness in appropriation, the main motive for 
patenting among firms in general is to protect innovations and thereby prevent 
imitation (Arundel et al., 1995; Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2000; Duguet & 
Kabla, 1998; Giuri et al., 2007; Granstrand, 1999; Thumm, 2004; Veer & Jell, 
2012). Other important motives are to avoid trials and to reach a strong position in 
negotiations (Arundel et al., 1995; Duguet & Kabla, 1998; Granstrand, 1999) and 
to block other firms’ R&D and patenting efforts (Cohen et al., 2000). 
Additionally, in industries where standards are of importance, for instance in 
                                                 
 
18 The patent propensity is however higher among firms where patents are rated more important 
for appropriation (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2004; Arundel & Kabla, 1998). 
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telecommunications, the possibility to reach a strong position in the standard by 
patenting essential inventions is an important motive to patent (Bekkers et al., 
2002; Granstrand, 1999).  
2.6 Strategic management of intellectual property 
Appropriation strategies as discussed above are closely related to the field of 
strategic management. Firms not only need to handle various forces on their 
current market (Porter, 1980), they need to dynamically explore new opportunities 
and at the same time exploit opportunities previously identified (March, 1991; 
Teece, 2006, 2009; Teece et al., 1997). As described in the introduction, strategic 
management of technological IP here refers to formulating and executing 
strategies related to technological IP, including issues such as how to acquire and 
create IP, how to govern IP, and how to exploit and extract value from 
(commercialize) IP. Thus, strategic IP management is central to both the 
exploration and exploitation of opportunities.  
The term strategic IP management is here used to mark a distinction to more 
operational IP management and to emphasize the relation to general strategic 
management. Mintzberg defines a strategy as “a pattern in a stream of decisions” 
(Mintzberg, 1978, p. 934), and (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) emphasize that 
strategies typically lie on a continuum between deliberate and emergent strategies. 
Deliberate strategies are patterns of decisions realized as intended, while emergent 
strategies are patterns of decisions realized despite or without intentions. Hence, 
Mintzberg and Waters recognize that on one hand are strategies not always 
deliberate, and on the other hand does a deliberate plan not always lead to a 
pattern of decisions according to the plan. Porter (1980, p. 34) describes 
competitive strategy as “taking offensive or defensive actions to create a 
defendable position in an industry […] and thereby yield a superior return on 
investment for the firm”. Relating IP management to this, two different aims of 
patenting can be identified. The first one, being an offensive aim, is to “block 
competitors from using a technology and in so doing increase their costs and time 
for imitation and/or for inventing around the patent, in order to increase their 
willingness to pay for a license or to stay away from a market (thereby ensuring 
‘market freedom’)”. The second one, being a defensive aim, is to “block the 
competitors from blocking oneself, and thereby ensure ‘design freedom’” 
(Granstrand, 1999, p. 214). The offensive aim then relates to both proprietary 
strategies, in which the patent holder tries to obtain an exclusive position in a 
technology, and leveraging strategies, in which the patent holder tries to get other 
direct or indirect benefits from a patent, for instance through licensing to generate 
revenues or through cross-licensing to access other resources (Somaya, 2012). In 
addition, benefits of patenting include: The creation of an identifiable asset that 
can be used in licensing, financing, cooperation, divestment, etc.; the creation of 
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an asset that can be activated on the balance sheet; the enablement of intra-firm 
licensing for cross-country transfer of profits; etc. (Granstrand, 1999, 2010). Costs 
of patenting relate to the direct costs of writing (including translating), filing and 
renewing patents, the costs of monitoring and enforcing patents, and the 
drawbacks with the related information disclosure. 
In a resource-based view of the firm a strategy can be described as the resource 
allocation that facilitates a maintained or improved performance (Barney, 1997). 
A similar emphasis on resources could be traced to the military-related19 
definition of strategy as “the science or art of employing all the military, 
economic, political, and other resources of a country to achieve the objects of 
war” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010).20 Taking the increasingly dynamic 
business landscape into account, strategic management literature commonly focus 
on (1) how to best utilize existing resources of the firm and (2) how to develop, 
renew and adapt resources and competences by dynamic capabilities (Teece, 
2009; Teece et al., 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984). IP management, and more 
specifically patent management, is central to both these concerns as exemplified 
by the following quote: 
1. Patent rights are important as competitive means for the protection and 
commercial exploitation of new technologies. 
2. Patent information is important as a means for technology and competitor 
intelligence. (Granstrand, 1999, p. 71) 
First, strategic IP management impacts opportunity exploitation and the 
utilization of existing resources, and a few examples are given here. IP strategies 
are used to enable value appropriation from innovation investments (Arundel, 
2001; Granstrand, 1999; Levin et al., 1987; Teece, 1986, 2006). Technology 
exclusivity can primarily be protected by patents or trade secrets, enabling larger 
market shares and higher margins. In addition, in order to support opportunity 
exploitation activities, IP management must ensure freedom to operate within a 
certain domain. As described above, a patent does not provide the patent holder 
freedom to operate; exclusive rights (e.g., patents) related to necessary 
complementary resources can be held by other agents restricting and blocking the 
freedom to operate, possibly leading to hold-up problems and tragedies of the 
anticommons (Heller, 1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Available reactive 
solutions for IP management include integration, acquisition of blocking rights, 
                                                 
 
19 The concept of strategy was first established in relation to military activities. 
20 Information resources are commonly heterogeneously distributed and “sticky”, i.e., costly to 
acquire, transfer, and use in a new setting (von Hippel, 1994), and therefore a source of 
competitive advantage. 
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contractual agreements (license agreements), invalidation of blocking rights, and 
infringement. Strategic IP management also involves proactive solutions. 
Patentability requires novelty of the invention and firms can therefore act 
strategically in order to limit other actors’ possibilities to patent by defensive 
publishing (or in other terms strategic disclosure), meaning that the novelty of an 
invention is “exhausted” with some sort of publication. Trade secrets are not 
published; a well-kept trade secret does therefore not enable freedom to use the 
protected secret if someone else would patent it. This is an inherent risk with 
relying upon trade secrecy protection.21 Finally, IP management enables many 
different ways of commercializing technologies. Besides leveraging internal 
exploitation by product and service “production”, the use of IP enables open 
innovation and external technology exploitation, for instance by patent sales and 
various types of licensing schemes (Alexy et al., 2009; Bogers et al., 2012; 
Chesbrough, 2003). 
Second, and maybe less obvious, strategic IP management impacts opportunity 
exploration and dynamic capabilities, and again a few examples are given. As 
described above, IPRs and patents enable knowledge and technology trade, which 
would otherwise be hampered by the information paradox (Arrow, 1962). This, in 
turn, enables new combinations leading to innovations (Schumpeter, 1934). 
Technologies in a specific industry, such as the ICT industry, can, for example, 
find new uses in other industries (Björkdahl, 2009), leading to technological 
convergence (Rosenberg, 1963). Alternatively, inventors can transfer their 
technologies to other firms within the same industry that are better suited to make 
the application, production, and marketing investments that are necessary to turn 
inventions into commercially successful innovations, again by enabling 
combinations of resources of different types. Further, patent information can give 
rich data, as illustrated by the quote above, for instance as input to the internal 
R&D process. Such data can direct a firm’s R&D activities towards, for example, 
in-licensing, inventing around activities, complementary innovation activities, or 
blocking activities. Patents, being a measurable output of R&D, can also be used 
to stimulate internal inventiveness (Granstrand, 1999). In cumulative (systems) 
technologies, where multiple agents are involved, patents can be used to govern 
and enable the interorganizational exploration processes. IPRs and related 
contracts can reduce information impactedness, uncertainty, and opportunism22 
and thereby, by decreasing risks, enable investments in complementary innovation 
                                                 
 
21 This is true also in the US after its America Invents Act (2011), where the first-to-invent 
criterion of patentability was changed to the first-to-file (a patent application) criterion. 
22 See section 2.4.1 or Williamson (1975) for descriptions of these concepts. 
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and transaction-specific assets. An example is the use of FRAND requirements in 
some standards, meaning that participants must agree to license out their essential 
patents to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms. A 
“tight” appropriability regime is then not necessarily most conducive for dynamic 
competitiveness, especially not if widening the scope from the firm perspective to 
the perspective of innovation networks and technological ecosystems (Baldwin & 
von Hippel, 2011; Dahlander & Wallin, 2006; Pisano, 2006).  
As described above, knowledge is an impure public good, and the use of IPRs and 
patents is commonly assumed to aim to increase excludability of an intellectual 
resource. However, IP management can also work to limit excludability and 
enable (controlled) accessibility, as in the case of open source licensing schemes 
(O'Mahony, 2003). Strategic IP management can thus be used to proactively 
ensure accessibility to innovations, in order to promote cumulative innovation 
under certain conditions. It is then clear that IP strategies have to be aligned with 
corporate strategies and environmental factors in order to reap their full potential 
(Alexy et al., 2009; Granstrand, 1999; Phelps & Kline, 2009; Reitzig, 2007). 
A number of important factors for IP management can be identified (see Table 2.3 
for examples). First, the innovation type impacts the effectiveness of various IP 
strategies. Typically, product innovations are relatively more suited for patent 
protection than, for example, process innovations. Second, as for most types of 
strategies, there are differences between large and small firms in terms of how 
effective various IP strategies are. Third, different industries are to various extent 
suitable for different types of management, due to the characteristics of the 
technologies, the legal situation (patent protection is for instance not applicable to 
all types of technologies), or something else. Fourth, the technological 
complexity, i.e., whether products and services are based on single inventions or 
more or less complex combinations of inventions, impacts the requirements on IP 
management. Businesses based on complex technologies may for instance require 
the use of various types of licensing strategies to enable freedom to operate. Fifth, 
the IP regime and the IPR laws and institutions available in either an industry or a 
nation impact the available managerial strategies. Patent protection on a market 
requires not only patent laws, but also that such laws are enforced (while 
monitoring is typically left to patent holders). Sixth, the market structure impacts 
the effectiveness of various types of IP management. If a market is guarded by 
other means, for instance by state monopolies, it might be inefficient to protect it 
also by IPR protection, since that is typically costly. 
Naturally, this thesis cannot investigate strategic IP management in all available 
combinations of these “dimensions” of factors. Nevertheless, variations in most 
dimensions have been covered by the thesis. Paper II, for example, includes firms 
with both product and process innovations and focuses on SMEs while Paper IV 
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and VI focus on large firms. Paper IV uses a case from the electronics industry 
with complex technologies while Paper VI uses cases from the automotive 
industry with less complex technologies. Paper III takes into consideration both 
weak and strong IP regimes, and Paper IV uses a case in which the market 
structure varies over time. 
 
Table 2.3 Examples of factors related to IP management 
Factor Examples References (examples) 
Innovation type Process 
Product 
Service 
Arundel and Kabla (1998), Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), Granstrand (1999) 
Firm size Large 
Small 
Arundel and Kabla (1998), Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), Davis (2006), Hanel 
(2006), Kitching and Blackburn (1998), 
Mansfield (1986) 
Industry Chemical 
Electronics 
Mechanical 
Pharmaceutical 
Software 
Chabchoub and Niosi (2005), Granstrand 
(1999), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), 
Mansfield (1986), O'Mahony (2003), 
Scherer (1983) 
Technological complexity Complex (‘Mul-tech’) 
Cumulative 
Discrete 
Bessen (2004), Bessen and Maskin (2009), 
Cohen et al. (2000), Granstrand et al. 
(1997), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Somaya 
et al. (2011), Teece (2009) 
IP regime Strong 
Weak 
Granstrand (2006b), Hu and Jefferson 
(2009), Keupp et al. (2010), Teece (1986, 
2006) 
Market structure Competition 
Monopoly 
Oligopoly 
Bekkers et al. (2002), Blind and Thumm 
(2004), Granstrand (1999) 
 
2.7 Key research papers within the field 
This final section of the frame of reference presents results from a structured 
literature review, aimed to identify the most important works and scholars, in 
addition to what has been described above. This literature review is based on a 
topic search in the Web of Science database on 2 May, 2012. The topic search 
identifies words or phrases in titles, keywords, or abstracts, but only in papers 
published by journals included in the Web of Science database (typically those 
listed by different Science Citation Indexes). Thus, the search is limited to journal 
papers, meaning that some important works in form of books, reports, and papers 
in other journals are lacking. Additionally, ranking important works based on their 
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citations, as is done here, is subject to large limitations as well, since a high 
number of citations does not necessarily mean many reads or large impact. 
Despite its limitations, a citation-based review is useful for identifying at least 
some of the most important works in a field, and it is therefore used here as a 
complement to the literature discussed above. 
The literature review used the search string ("intellectual propert*" OR patent*) 
AND (economic* OR manag* OR strateg*), within the research area ‘business 
economics’. The result of the search listed 2 483 papers, and this list was exported 
and analyzed with the HistCite software provided by ThomsonReuters.  
The most cited papers are presented in Table 2.4. Clearly, this list is dominated by 
papers that are not explicitly studying IP management. With a few exceptions 
(Hall, 1992; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003), the papers in Table 2.4 are only 
implicitly related to IP management, and mainly by the use of patent documents in 
the measurement of innovative output (number of patents) or innovation 
relatedness (patent citations, inventors). 
However, the most productive authors as identified by the literature review are 
those that actually do work on IP management, despite the fairly late interest for 
the subject among management scholars. The list of the most productive scholars 
in terms of paper output, as presented in Table 2.5, is topped by Ulrich 
Lichtenthaler and Holger Ernst. A number of their co-authored papers were 
retracted23 during the summer of 2012, however, and the ranking would probably 
have been different if taking that into account. Other scholars on the list include, 
for example, Josh Lerner, Oliver Gassmann, John Cantwell, Christine Greenhalgh, 
Markus Reitzig, and Deepak Somaya. Table 2.5 also lists the most common 
research outlets for the papers identified in the structured review. The list is 
unquestionably topped by Research Policy, followed by a number of journals 
ranging from technology and innovation-oriented ones (e.g., International Journal 
of Technology Management and R&D Management) to more general ones (e.g., 
Strategic Management Journal and Organization Science). The journals focusing 
specifically on various aspects of IP have not (yet) reached the top list. 
The most rewarding result of this structured literature review is probably the 
identification of the most cited references by the identified literature. The top 
twenty list is presented in Table 2.6, and includes some of the most important 
works underlying the field of strategic IP management. Griliches (1990) is again 
ranked first, cited by more than 10% of the identified papers, and followed by 
Levin et al. (1987), being probably the first empirical study on different 
                                                 
 
23 Ulrich Lichtenthaler has claimed responsibility for most of the errors leading to retractions. 
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appropriation strategies. The works by Arrow (1962) and Teece (1986) are early 
and important cornerstones in the field on the theoretical and conceptual level, 
and the list also includes some important empirical works, such as Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001), Mansfield (1986), and Trajtenberg (1990). The connection to 
innovation management and strategic management is finally illustrated by, for 
example, Barney (1991), Cohen and Levinthal (1990), March (1991), and Teece 
et al. (1997). 
 
Table 2.4 The most cited papers as identified by the structured literature review 
 Author and year Journal Title GCS 
1 Griliches (1990) Journal of Economic 
Literature 
Patent statistics as economic indicators - 
A survey 
1018 
2 Mowery et al. 
(1996) 
Strategic 
Management Journal 
Strategic alliances and interfirm 
knowledge transfer 
643 
3 Ahuja (2000a) Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
Collaboration networks, structural holes, 
and innovation: A longitudinal study 
608 
4 Davenport et al. 
(1998) 
Sloan Management 
Review 
Successful knowledge management 
projects 
483 
5 Almeida and 
Kogut (1999) 
Management Science Localization of knowledge and the 
mobility of engineers in regional 
networks 
434 
6 Hall (1992) Strategic 
Management Journal 
The strategic analysis of intangible 
resources 
357 
7 Stuart (2000) Strategic 
Management Journal 
Interorganizational alliances and the 
performance of firms: A study of growth 
and innovation rates in a high-
technology industry 
302 
8 Ahuja (2000b) Strategic 
Management Journal 
The duality of collaboration: 
inducements and opportunities in the 
formation of interfirm linkages 
274 
9 Owen-Smith and 
Powell (2004) 
Organization Science Knowledge networks as channels and 
conduits: The effects of spillovers in the 
Boston biotechnology community 
263 
10 von Hippel and 
von Krogh (2003) 
Organization Science Open source software and the "private-
collective" innovation model: Issues for 
organization science 
242 
Notes: GCS = Global Citation Score (total number of citations from papers included in the entire 
Web of Science database) 
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Table 2.5 The most productive scholars and the most common research outlets (journals) 
Most productive scholars   #  Most common outlets      # 
1. Lichtenthaler U 15 
2. Ernst H  14 
3. Lerner J  12 
4. Gassmann O  10 
5. Grupp H  10 
6. Wright M  10 
7. Blind K    9 
8. Nelson RR    9 
9. Cantwell J    8 
10. Greenhalgh C   8 
11. Li MX     8 
12. Rogers M    8 
13. Stern S    8 
14. Chu AC    7 
15. de la Potterie BV   7 
16. Mowery DC   7 
17. Park Y    7 
18. Popp D    7 
19. Reitzig M    7 
20. Somaya D    7 
 
 1. Research Policy 189 
2. International Journal of  
Technology Management   81 
3. Technovation   75 
4. Technological Forecasting  
and Social Change   52 
5. Technology Analysis &  
Strategic Management   45 
6. Strategic Management  
Journal    38 
7. R&D Management   36 
8. Research-Technology  
Management    34 
9. Industrial and Corporate  
Change    32 
10. Management Science   30 
11. International Journal of  
Industrial Organization   25 
12. IEEE Transactions on  
Engineering Management   24 
13. PICMET 2010: Technology  
Management for Global  
Economic Growth   24 
14. Journal of Technology  
Transfer    22 
15. Journal of Product  
Innovation Management   20 
16. Journal of Business Ethics   19 
17. PICMET '07, Vols 1-6,  
Proceedings: Management of  
Converging Technologies   19 
18. Journal of International  
Business Studies   18 
19. Journal of Business  
Venturing    17 
20. Organization Science   17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: # = Number of papers 
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Table 2.6 The most frequently cited references by the research field 
 Author and year Journal Title # 
1 Griliches (1990) Journal of Economic 
Literature 
Patent statistics as economic indicators - A 
survey 
258 
2 Levin et al. (1987) Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 
Appropriating the returns from industrial 
research and development 
209 
3 Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on 
learning and innovation 
205 
4 Teece (1986) Research Policy Profiting from technological innovation: 
Implications for integration, collaboration, 
licensing and public policy 
178 
5 Jaffe et al. (1993) Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers 
as evidenced by patent citations 
177 
6 Nelson and Winter 
(1982) 
- (book) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 168 
7 Hall and Ziedonis (2001) The RAND Journal of 
Economics 
The patent paradox revisited: An empirical study 
of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry 
126 
8 Hausman et al. (1984) Econometrica Econometric models for count data with an 
application to the patents-R&D relationship 
116 
9 Barney (1991) Journal of Management Firm resources and sustained competitive 
advantage 
109 
10 Teece et al. (1997) Strategic Management 
Journal 
Dynamic capabilities and strategic management 106 
11 Jaffe (1986) American Economic 
Review 
Technological opportunity and spillovers of 
R&D: Evidence from firms' patents, profits and 
market value 
101 
12 Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989) 
The Economic Journal Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D 97 
13 Mansfield (1986) Management Science Patents and innovation: An empirical study 96 
14 Trajtenberg (1990) The RAND Journal of 
Economics 
A penny for your quotes: Patent citations and the 
value of innovations 
94 
15 Heller and Eisenberg 
(1998) 
Science Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons 
in biomedical research 
88 
16 Kogut and Zander 
(1992) 
Organization Science Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, 
and the replication of technology 
88 
17 March (1991) Organization Science Exploration and exploitation in organizational 
learning 
87 
18 Arrow (1962) NBER Economic welfare and the allocation of resources 
for invention 
84 
19 Mansfield et al. (1981) The Economic Journal Imitation costs and patents: An empirical study 83 
20 Merges and Nelson 
(1990) 
Columbia Law Review On the complex economics of patent scope 83 
Notes: # = Number of citing papers among the 2 483 papers identified 
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3 Research design and methodology 
The methods applied are described in detail in the appended papers. A short 
overview of the overall methodology and the basic assumptions employed is 
however given here, as well as a description of the relation between the overall 
purpose of the thesis and the various appended papers. The chapter also includes 
some contextual background to the conducted research. 
3.1 Research projects 
The research underlying this thesis has been performed in two projects; Patents 
and Innovations for Growth and Welfare24 and Management, Economics and IP 
Law of Open Distributed Innovation Processes. Both projects have been 
conducted within the Industrial Management and Economics research group at 
Department of Technology Management and Economics at Chalmers University 
of Technology. 
While the first research project is more policy and macro level oriented, the 
second is more management and micro level oriented. However, large 
interdependencies and interactions between the micro and macro levels have been 
found, and the two projects have therefore turned out to have major synergies, 
especially regarding the relation between micro and macro levels. 
The nature of IP issues requires an international and interdisciplinary approach 
when studying them (e.g., Granstrand, 2003), which has been addressed in both of 
the abovementioned research projects. More specifically, the need for taking 
managerial, economical, legal, and technological (MELT) factors into account 
have been identified in the projects, and the research teams have thus been 
designed to include such skills.25 Management, economics, and engineering have 
however been the main focus in this thesis, and these disciplines are also the 
author’s main disciplines. 
3.2 Research purposes and sub-studies 
Rather than being guided by an ex ante stated and overarching purpose or research 
question, the research process underlying this thesis has been guided by a general 
interest in exploring and developing the field of management and economics of 
IP. As the research process has evolved, the overall research has been directed by 
various aspects of opportunism, including financing and publication opportunities, 
                                                 
 
24 See also SOU (2006) and Granstrand (forthcoming). 
25 Other disciplines, such as sociology, behavioral science, political science, and history 
(technological, economical, and general) are also of importance. 
Innovation and intellectual property 
36 
access to empirical data, and questions arisen in relation to new findings. As such, 
the research process has been continuously adjusted, although always with a focus 
on management and economics of (technological) IP. However, each single paper, 
or sub-study, has been directed by a clear purpose and/or research question(s) (see 
Table 3.1). 
Nevertheless, the research results contribute to two overall purposes. The first 
purpose is to explore and explain strategic and innovation related intellectual 
property management practices, and the managerial and economic consequences 
of such practices. This purpose, mainly being descriptive and explanatory, is 
related to describing IP management. It is also related to explaining the causes of 
such IP management, and to predicting consequences. 
The thesis also contributes to a more normative purpose. The use of various types 
of open innovation practices (e.g., Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; Chesbrough, 
2003) requires new and/or adapted strategic IP management skills. The second 
purpose is therefore to develop managerial and economic frameworks, models, 
and tools to be used in the intersection between intellectual property management 
and open innovation practices. This purpose is related to prescribing new 
frameworks, models, and tools for IP management, and again to predicting 
consequences in order to prescribe the most effective and efficient solutions. 
The six appended papers contribute to these two thesis purposes to various 
extents, see Figure 3.1. The first purpose mainly relates to Paper I-IV and VI, 
while the second purpose mainly relates to Paper IV-VI. Each single paper is then 
related to a paper-specific purpose and one or more research questions, as further 
described below and in Table 3.1. 
Patent statistics (see, e.g., Figure 2.2) show that patenting in small countries, 
including Sweden, decreases, a trend that has not yet been explained. The purpose 
of Paper I is therefore to describe and explain fluctuations in patenting frequency 
and patenting propensity, especially concerning national applications filed at the 
Swedish PTO. 
Previous research indicates that there are differences in how large firms and SMEs 
utilize and benefit from patent systems. A main finding from previous research is 
that SMEs are less likely to use patents than larger firms (e.g., Arundel & Kabla, 
1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Chabchoub & Niosi, 2005; Mansfield, 
1986). The purpose of paper II is therefore to review empirical literature on patent 
propensity, appropriation strategies, and motives for patenting and also to 
empirically study how patenting is used by R&D management in entrepreneurial 
SMEs. 
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Research project I: 
Patents and Innovations 
for Growth and Welfare 
   Paper I: The anatomy of rise and fall of patenting and 
propensity to patent: The case of Sweden 
 
       
   Paper II: Patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs: A 
literature review and an empirical study of innovation 
appropriation, patent propensity, and motives 
 
Thesis purpose I: To explore and explain 
strategic and innovation related intellectual 
property management practices, and the 
managerial and economic consequences of 
such practices 
    
  
Research project II: 
Management, 
Economics and IP Law 
of Open Distributed 
Innovation Processes 
   Paper III: Multinational technology and intellectual 
property management - Is there global convergence and/or 
specialization? 
   
        
   Paper IV: Conceptualizing innovation openness: A 
framework and illustrative case 
       
            Thesis purpose II: To develop managerial 
and economic frameworks, models, and 
tools to be used in the intersection between 
intellectual property management and 
open innovation practices 
   Paper V: The 25% rule revisited and a new investment-
based method for determining FRAND licensing royalties 
   
      
   Paper VI: Managing the intellectual property disassembly 
problem 
     
            
Figure 3.1 Relation between thesis purposes and appended papers 
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Globalization and internationalization of businesses in general, and patenting in 
particular, lead to the question whether firms in different countries around the 
world increasingly develop similar strategies and behaviors. If so, and if similar 
markets are chosen for patent applications, there should be signs of global 
convergence in terms of preferred markets for patenting from firms and inventors 
in various countries (market convergence). If there is a convergence of preferred 
markets, a related question is whether there is also a convergence of the set of 
prioritized technologies in various countries (technology convergence26), or 
whether technological specialization dominates.27 The purpose of Paper III is thus 
to explore developments along a number of dimensions of convergence and their 
interrelations in a global context, and the ensuing implications of any signs of 
convergence for technology management. 
A related question, to some extent addressed in Paper III, is whether there is a 
convergence of international management practices. An example of an 
increasingly important phenomenon worldwide is the management of innovation 
in an open and collaborative way over firm boundaries. Despite an increasing 
amount of research on open innovation, little consensus is yet to be found about 
what openness in innovation actually means. The purpose of paper IV is therefore 
to develop a general conceptual framework for innovation openness. The paper 
especially looks into the role of IP management in governing innovation 
openness.  
In collaborative R&D where multiple actors are involved in inventing and 
commercializing a technology, the value that is created and captured jointly by 
these actors must be distributed in some way, most desirably by fair and 
reasonable principles. This is a central issue for IP management in firms 
employing such innovation strategies. The purpose of Paper V is to develop and 
present a generalized method for calculating reasonable royalties, which works 
not only in one-to-one but also in many-to-many (as well as in one-to-many and 
many-to-one) licensing deals. 
 
                                                 
 
26 Note that technology convergence is distinguished from technological convergence, as studied 
by Rosenberg (1963) and others. Technological convergence then means that two or more 
technologies are increasingly jointly developed, combined, or merged. 
27 For studies of technological specialization, see Archibugi and Pianta (1992, 1994), Cantwell 
(1989, 1991), Cantwell and Vertova (2004), Dosi et al. (1990), Gambardella and Torrisi (1998), 
Patel and Pavitt (1987, 1991), and Soete (1981, 1987). 
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Table 3.1 Paper-specific purposes and research questions 
Pa
pe
r I
 
Title The anatomy of rise and fall of patenting and propensity to patent: The case of 
Sweden 
Purpose To describe and explain fluctuations in patenting frequency and patenting 
propensity, especially concerning national applications filed at the Swedish PTO 
Research question 1. What are the causes of fluctuations in patent applications filed at the Swedish 
PTO? 
Pa
pe
r I
I 
Title Patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs: A literature review and an empirical 
study of innovation appropriation, patent propensity, and motives 
Purpose To review empirical literature on patent propensity, appropriation strategies, and 
motives for patenting and also to empirically study how patenting is used by R&D 
management in entrepreneurial SMEs 
Research question 1. What is the current state of empirical research of patent propensity, appropriation 
strategies, and motives for patenting? 
2. What is the importance and role of patenting in entrepreneurial SMEs? 
3. What are the motives for and against using patenting among entrepreneurial 
SMEs? 
Pa
pe
r I
II
 
Title Multinational technology and intellectual property management - Is there global 
convergence and/or specialization? 
Purpose To explore developments along a number of dimensions of convergence and their 
interrelations in a global context, and the ensuing implications of any signs of 
convergence for technology management 
Research question 1. Do the sets of country markets selected by inventive firms/individuals for 
patenting become increasingly similar, i.e., is there a market convergence globally? 
2. Do the sets of technological areas developed and patented by inventive 
firms/individuals become increasingly similar, i.e., is there a technology 
convergence globally? 
Pa
pe
r I
V
 Title Conceptualizing innovation openness: A framework and illustrative case 
Purpose To develop a general conceptual framework for innovation openness 
Research question 1. What are the main dimensions of innovation openness? 
2. What is the role of intellectual property in open innovation systems? 
Pa
pe
r V
 
Title The 25% rule revisited and a new investment-based method for determining 
FRAND licensing royalties 
Purpose To develop and present a generalized method to calculate reasonable royalties, 
which works not only in one-to-one but also in many-to-many (as well as in one-to-
many and many-to-one) licensing deals 
Research question 1. How should values be distributed in cases of multiple intellectual property rights 
holders? 
Pa
pe
r V
I 
Title Managing the intellectual property disassembly problem 
Purpose To describe and provide solutions to the intellectual property disassembly problem 
Research question 1. How do intellectual property rights impact separation of previously integrated 
and technology-based firms, units, portfolios, etc.? 
2. How can the intellectual property disassembly problem be mitigated? 
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Finally, in various types of open innovation activities or terminations of 
collaborative R&D projects, as well as in various types of M&As and divestments 
(MADs), a specific IP-related problem can occur, namely the problem to find a 
contractual arrangement for allocation of IPRs that allows for separating out 
(disentangling) an entity or unit of resources in order to enable a transaction or 
transfer of it. In Paper VI, this is defined as the intellectual property disassembly 
problem, and the purpose of Paper VI is to describe and provide solutions to the 
intellectual property disassembly problem. 
3.3 Basic assumptions and research strategy 
Before describing the research methods used, it is of importance to describe the 
point of departure of the study in terms of epistemological and ontological 
assumptions, since these naturally impact and guide the choice of methods as well 
as the analysis of the collected data. The basic assumptions of this thesis can 
probably most closely be described as critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989). In critical 
realism, social phenomena are assumed to be “produced by mechanisms that are 
real, but that are not directly accessible to observation and are discernible only 
through their effects” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 628).28 Hence, in terms of 
ontology (the nature of existence), the critical realist approach accepts neither 
pure objectivism nor pure constructionism. Regarding epistemology (the nature of 
knowledge), critical realism implies two things: 
First, it implies that, whereas positivists take the view that the scientist’s 
conceptualization of reality actually directly reflects that reality, realists argue that 
the scientist’s conceptualization is simply a way of knowing that reality […] 
Secondly, by implication, critical realists unlike positivists are perfectly content to 
admit into their explanations theoretical terms that are not directly amenable to 
observation. As a result, hypothetical entities to account for regularities in the 
natural or social orders (the ‘generative mechanisms’ to which Bhaskar refers) are 
perfectly admissible for realists, but not for positivists. (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 
18)  
Critical realism has been argued to constitute more accurate assumptions than the 
prevailing positivist approach when studying the interplay between micro and 
macro levels in economics (Lawson, 1997, 2003). This has come as a reaction to 
the mathematical modeling and pure deductive approach otherwise commonly 
used in mainstream economics: 
                                                 
 
28 For a description of social structures and social mechanisms, see Bhaskar (1989) or Smith 
(1998). 
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It seems to be the case, however, that the ontological presuppositions of the 
methods of mathematical modeling used by economists are rarely questioned or 
even acknowledged, at least not in any systematic or sustained way. As a result, the 
possibility of a lack of ontological fit […] is not considered […] And my 
assessment, simply stated […] is that these preconditions of mathematical-
deductivist methods appear not to arise very often in the social realm. (Lawson, 
2003, p. 12)  
The critique of mainstream economics above does not mean that mathematical 
methods and models, and the related clarity, rigor and consistency, should be 
abandoned, but they should be complemented with other methods.  As Lawson 
(2003, p. 21) puts it: “I do though insist that these attributes are not enough, that 
ability to illuminate the social realm counts as well.” 
Drawing upon the arguments above, both inductive and deductive research 
strategies are used in the research underlying this thesis. These are seldom pure 
forms of methodologies, since deductive studies typically include an element of 
induction and vice versa. The combination of induction and deduction means that 
this study can be categorized as an iterative study in which data and theory are 
simultaneously (or iteratively) developed and analyzed (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
Also drawing upon the arguments above, both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods are iteratively used. This is further discussed below. 
3.4 Research methods and data sources 
The IPR field is an area where a lot of quantitative data sources are available. 
These are very useful, but sole reliance upon these data sources would probably 
not give as valuable and interesting results as if complementing with other types 
of data. In fact, numerous authors have advocated the use of multiple methods, 
commonly denoted triangulation29, in order to increase validity (Bryman & Bell, 
2007; Creswell, 2008; Flick, 2009; Jick, 1979). Multiple methods can however do 
more than only increase validity, especially when combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods: 
That is, beyond the analysis of overlapping variance, the use of multiple measures 
may also uncover some unique variance which otherwise may have been neglected 
by single methods. It is here that qualitative methods, in particular, can play an 
especially prominent role by eliciting data and suggesting conclusions to which 
other methods would be blind. Elements of the context are illuminated. In this 
sense, triangulation may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from 
                                                 
 
29 Note that the exact definition of triangulation varies slightly in various literatures on research 
methods. 
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multiple perspectives but also to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or 
deeper dimensions to emerge. (Jick, 1979, pp. 603-604) 
This study has therefore employed various data collection methods, including 
interviews, questionnaires surveys, patent statistics, and document studies, in a 
complementary way. These methods are described below and more in depth in the 
various papers, and they are summarized in Table 3.2. Besides the data sources 
specifically described in the papers, a number of interviews framing the research 
in an industrial and international context have been undertaken. The reason for 
this has essentially been to further increase the number of perspectives and to 
enrich the understanding of the subject, as argued by Jick (1979), especially due 
to its interdisciplinary and international character. The most important of these 
‘contextualizing’ interviews are presented in Table 3.3. In addition, meetings with 
practitioners and scholars at various conferences have also provided important 
input to the study. 
 
Table 3.2 Empirical data collection methods in the different papers 
 Patent statistics Questionnaires Interviews Document studies1) 
Paper I X X2) X3) - 
Paper II - - X - 
Paper III X - X X 
Paper IV X - X X 
Paper V - - - - 
Paper VI - - X X 
Notes: 1) This category emphasizes the use of document studies for empirical data collection. 
Note that all studies contain some form of document study when designing and framing 
the study based on previous research. 
 2) The author of this thesis did not take part in the main questionnaire and sample design, 
 but did take part in data collection and data analysis. 
 3) The author of this thesis did not take part in the interviews.  
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Table 3.3 List of the most important contextualizing interviews 
Company/organization Country Interviewee(s) position at time of interview 
AstraZeneca India India Managing Director 
Biocon India Founder and CEO 
Delhi High Court India High Court Judges 
E.ON Sweden Head of Innovation and Environment 
R&D Coordinator 
Ericsson Sweden Vice President of Patent Strategies and 
Portfolio Management 
EU-China IPR2 China Team Leader 
Evalueserve India Chairman 
Global Head of IP Operations 
Huawei China IP Deputy Director 
Vice Director of Industry Standard 
IBM UK IP Law Counsel 
IBM Japan Senior Counsel IP Law 
Infosys India Associate Vice President & Head of IP Cell 
Japan Intellectual Property Association Japan Executive Managing Director 
Japan Management of Technology Association Japan Senior Executive Director 
Secretary General 
Korean Institute for Intellectual Property Korea Researchers 
Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) Korea Director International Cooperation Division 
Macau government Macau Legal advisor to government 
Ministry of Science and Technology China Director 
NanoCarrier Japan Senior Advisor 
Nokia Finland Vice President Legal and IP 
Nokia UK Director IPR Regulatory Affairs 
Samsung Korea Head of IP Litigations 
SKF Sweden Director SKF Business Consulting 
State Intellectual Property Office China Hearing 
Researchers 
Tata Consultancy Services India Head of Components Engineering Group 
Consultants 
The Office of the Controller General of Patents, 
Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM) 
India Controller General 
Head of Delhi Patent Office 
Tokyo Small and Medium Business Investment & 
Consultation 
Japan President and CEO (Former director of IP 
Strategy Headquarters in Japan) 
Volvo Group Sweden President and CEO 
CEO of Volvo Technology Transfer 
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The purpose of Paper I is to describe and explain fluctuations in patenting 
frequency and patenting propensity, especially concerning national applications 
filed at the Swedish PTO, and it is based primarily on patent statistics and 
questionnaire surveys, but to some extent also on interviews. The sources for 
patent statistics were primarily the Swedish PTO, the US PTO (USPTO), and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and they are mainly used to 
describe the fluctuations in patenting. A questionnaire survey was performed 
among three samples of firms; large patentees, small patentees, and patent 
consultancy firms. The data from the questionnaire mainly explains the 
fluctuations. Tail sampling was found most suitable when sampling. On one hand, 
the use of tail sampling could limit the generalizability of the results, but on the 
other hand there is a large benefit in the fact that the results then do actually 
explain a major part of the fluctuations on national level. Thus, in this case tail 
sampling is expected to increase the validity of the results. The large patentees 
were essentially sampled among the largest Swedish firms with the highest 
patenting frequency, in order to explain as much of patenting fluctuations on 
national level as possible. 38 out of 73 firms responded (52%). The sample of 
SMEs focused on smaller patentees with a decrease in patent frequency. 20 out of 
51 firms responded (39%). The third sample consisted of the largest patent 
consultancy firms in Sweden. The 12 out of 14 responding firms (86%) jointly 
corresponded to about 83% of the total sales of the patent consultancy industry in 
Sweden.30 All in all, questionnaires from 70 respondents were collected. 
Paper II presents a literature review and empirical material collected in interviews 
in three samples of entrepreneurial SMEs. The concept of entrepreneurial firms is 
in this case used to denote on one hand firms based on new technologies and on 
the other hand firms with new or improved commercialization.31 The primary data 
source in Paper II is 26 semi-structured interviews. Non-probability sampling was 
used when selecting the firms, focusing on the tail of firms in various variables. 
The first interview sample consisted of eight firms with high sales growth, the 
second sample consisted of twelve hi-tech firms, and the third sample consisted of 
six firms in a Swedish region, ‘Gnosjöregionen’, recognized for its entrepreneurial 
spirit (Wigren, 2003). See Paper II for more details. 
                                                 
 
30 Note that the author of this thesis did not take part in the questionnaire and sample design for the 
samples of large and small patentees in Paper I. The author did however take part in the 
questionnaire design and sampling for the sample of patent consultancy firms, as well as in the 
data collection and data analysis for all samples. 
31 See Gartner (1990) for a discussion on the concept of entrepreneurship. 
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Paper III explores developments along a number of dimensions of convergence 
and their interrelations in a global context, and the ensuing implications of any 
signs of convergence for technology management. It is mainly based on patent 
statistics, but also to some degree on interviews with large firms, PTOs, and 
policy representatives worldwide (about 50, including many of the ones in Table 
3.3) and on documents (e.g., patent laws). The patent data was collected from 
WIPO and USPTO. The paper focuses on global convergence, and convergence is 
then defined as a decrease in difference. To mitigate problems with measurement 
validity, three different difference indexes, based on patent statistics, were 
constructed for market convergence and technology convergence, respectively, 
i.e., six difference indexes in total.32 All pairs of countries were compared in 
terms of patent market shares and technology shares, and related measures, 
resulting in ሺܰଶ െ ܰሻ 2⁄   unique difference indexes for each type of index, with ܰ 
number of countries (although missing data for some countries led to fewer 
unique indexes in practice). Convergence was then measured as a decrease in 
difference indexes. See Paper III for a more elaborate description of index 
constructions and statistical tests. 
The purpose of paper IV is to develop a general conceptual framework for 
innovation openness. The framework is built upon previous research to large 
extent, but also upon a longitudinal case study of technology development in 
mobile telecommunications. The case study is based primarily on document 
studies and secondarily on interviews (among which only a few have been 
conducted within this PhD project). In addition, the case partly includes 
quantitative data on essential patents in the different telecommunication standards 
(1G, 2G, 3G, and 4G), reported to the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI). The patent data is partly used to measure how concentrated 
among actors the technological development is in various generations of 
standards. However, since the essential patents are self-reported to ETSI, and 
since extensive over-reporting is likely due to the importance of holding a strong 
patent position in standard setting and licensing agreements, the reported essential 
patents need to be evaluated before treating them as essential patents to ensure 
measurement validity. Such evaluations have been made in various studies, 
among only a few are publicly available. Here, the results from the studies 
conducted by Fairfield Resources International (2005, 2007, 2009a, b) are used. 
                                                 
 
32 Some of these indexes are partly based on the work of Balassa (1965) on revealed comparative 
advantage. Technology convergence further relates to the works on technological specialization by 
Soete (1981, 1987), Patel and Pavitt (1987, 1991), and others. 
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The purpose of Paper V is to develop and present a generalized method to 
calculate reasonable royalties, which works not only in one-to-one but also in 
many-to-many (as well as in one-to-many and many-to-one) licensing deals. 
Paper V does not include any empirical data, but relies upon tool development 
based on fairness principles and basic algebra. 
Finally, Paper VI aims to define, describe, and provide solutions to the intellectual 
property disassembly problem. The empirical data set consists of two cases from 
the automotive industry, namely Saab Automobile and Volvo Car Corporation 
(VCC), based on interviews and document studies. In order to explore the 
problem, which has not previously been researched, open and unstructured 
interviews were deemed most appropriate (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 15 interviews 
were carried out face to face within the two case companies, typically lasting in 
between one and three hours (with a few exceptions of shorter telephone 
interviews). The interviewees included the chief executive officers (CEOs), chief 
technology officers (CTOs), and other important executive/management/R&D 
positions in the case companies. In addition, five interviews were carried out with 
seven interviewees among large law firms as well as independent observers and 
personnel from other automotive companies. The interviews within each case 
were complemented with documents (from newspapers, annual reports, company 
statements, etc.) and used to compile a case story. Thus, the empirical data in 
Paper VI is based on 20 interviews with 22 interviewees as well as on document 
studies. 
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4 Summaries of and contributions to the appended papers 
This chapter presents the summaries of the appended papers. These summaries 
leave little room for methodological, theoretical, and empirical details. Therefore, 
readers are referred to chapter 5 and the appended papers for more information. 
The chapter also includes descriptions of the author’s contributions to co-authored 
papers. 
4.1 Paper I 
The anatomy of rise and fall of patenting and propensity to patent: The case 
of Sweden 
Fluctuations in patenting frequency and propensity to patent have caught 
increasing interest, not the least since the emergence of a worldwide pro-patent 
era. In this paper fluctuations in Swedish patent frequency are described and 
analyzed, based on statistics and questionnaire survey studies among large and 
small patentees as well as among IP consultancy firms, complemented with 
interviews. The results confirm the importance of size of R&D and size of 
patenting resources for both large and small firms and for both positive and 
negative growth of patenting. In addition, some new determinants were found, of 
which some also discriminated between large and small firms. A shift to more 
quality-oriented patenting strategies with more selective patenting led to 
decreased patenting propensity and frequency, especially among large firms. As to 
propensity to patent using different routes, national first filings are declining in 
the longer run on average for small countries like Sweden and Finland, as 
especially large companies internationalize their IP operations and increasingly 
use the PCT route. 
Author’s contribution: The author of this thesis did not take part in the initial 
study design, including the sampling of large and small patentees. The author did 
however take part in designing the sub-study among patent consultancy firms. 
Data collection and data analysis was handled jointly by the paper’s two co-
authors in collaboration with a number of other project members, and the final 
paper was written jointly by the two co-authors. 
4.2 Paper II 
Patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs: A literature review and an 
empirical study of innovation appropriation, patent propensity, and motives 
Managers make a number of strategic choices when trying to capture returns from 
innovation investments, including what appropriation strategy to use and whether 
or not to patent, strategic choices that depend among other things on firm size. 
Previous literature, being reviewed in this paper, shows that the patent propensity 
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is lower in (SMEs) than in large firms and that patenting as means for 
appropriation is of less importance among SMEs. CEOs and/or R&D managers of 
26 entrepreneurial SMEs have been interviewed to explain these differences and 
to provide insight on how patenting is used in SMEs. The patent competence was 
low among the studied SMEs, and internal patent resources were found to be 
important for effective and efficient use of the patent system; for application as 
well as monitoring and enforcement. While of limited perceived importance for 
protecting inventions in entrepreneurial SMEs, patents were used to attract 
customers and venture capital, which is of utmost importance for the survival and 
growth of these firms. Thus, patenting has an important role to play even in firms 
where the protective function of patents is secondary. 
Author’s contribution: Single-authored paper. 
4.3 Paper III 
Multinational technology and intellectual property management - Is there 
global convergence and/or specialization? 
The paper gives various indications of market and technology diversification as 
well as of global market and technology convergence (rather than specialization) 
in the context of managerial, legal and economic convergence. The results show 
that different countries focus on a wider but increasingly similar set of markets for 
R&D outputs in form of patents, which implies increasing intra-national market 
diversification and inter-national market convergence. The results also show that 
different countries focus on a wider but increasingly similar set of technologies 
that are patented, which implies increasing intra-national technology 
diversification and inter-national technology convergence. In addition, intellectual 
property (IP) legal convergence takes place as newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) have strengthened their IP regimes in compliance with TRIPS and 
subsequently do so in the context of their indigenous innovation policies. Asian 
NICs have significantly increased their international patenting and supply of 
patented inventions. Altogether, this puts new demands across countries on 
multinational technology and innovation management skills, and in particular 
multinational IP management skills. 
Author’s contribution: The idea of the convergence theme employed in the paper 
was originated by the co-author. The author of this thesis then had the main 
responsibility for the quantitative study design, index development, quantitative 
data collection, and quantitative analysis. Data from interviews aiming to 
complement the quantitative data was collected jointly by the two co-authors. 
Interpretations and analysis on a more general level was performed jointly by the 
co-authors, as was the authoring of the final paper. 
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4.4 Paper IV 
Conceptualizing innovation openness: A framework and illustrative case 
Open innovation has become an increasingly recognized source of innovativeness 
and competitive advantage. However, various perspectives on innovation 
openness co-exist and a complete comprehension of the underlying mechanisms 
and dimensions is still lacking. This paper therefore develops a conceptual 
framework that helps to better describe and analyze innovation openness. We 
draw on resource-/capability-based, transaction-/contract-based and (intellectual) 
property rights-based perspectives to conceptualize innovation openness as 
consisting of three main dimensions, namely resource distribution, technology 
governance and technology accessibility. We also present an illustrative case of 
four generations of mobile communication systems to exemplify the value of the 
framework and to further illustrate the multi-layered and dynamic nature of 
innovation openness, as well as the important role of intellectual property rights. 
As such, we conclude that any notion of a stable optimum and one-dimensional 
view on innovation openness is overly simplistic and likely to mislead managerial 
and policy decisions. 
Author’s contribution: The author of this thesis had the main responsibility for the 
illustrative example, including collection and analysis of new data (mostly 
secondary), complementing already available historical data from one of the other 
co-authors. The conceptual development was performed jointly by the three co-
authors, as was the writing of the final paper. The author of this thesis is the 
corresponding author of the paper. 
4.5 Paper V 
The 25% rule revisited and a new investment-based method for determining 
FRAND licensing royalties 
This paper starts with briefly discussing the 25% rule and the argumentation for 
and against it. The paper continues with developing a new investment-based 
method for determining FRAND licensing royalties, a method not only applicable 
to one-to-one bilateral licensing deals but also to multilateral deals with multiple 
license sellers and multiple license buyers. The paper ends with discussing 
limitations and generalizations, opening up for further research. 
Author’s contribution: The idea to base licensing royalties on equal rates of ROI 
had been presented for the case of bilateral licensing in an earlier paper by one of 
the co-authors (Granstrand, 2006a), resulting in what is stated as Case A in the 
paper. That co-author had the idea to generalize this result to multilateral licensing 
deals (Case B and Case C), and developed the formal specifications for 
generalizing the model. The author of this thesis then used the idea that licensees 
Innovation and intellectual property 
50 
could be treated both collectively and individually (see the second paragraph of 
the Appendix in the paper), and could thus add further developments to the model, 
resulting in what is now reported as Case B and Case C in the paper. The author 
of this thesis also created the accompanying calculation tool, available for 
download. The final paper was written jointly by the two co-authors. 
4.6 Paper VI 
Managing the intellectual property disassembly problem 
This paper deals with the intellectual property (IP) disassembly problem. The IP 
disassembly problem refers to the problem of separating and disintegrating 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) for enabling a sale of a part of a company / 
business / project. Managing this problem becomes increasingly important, as it is 
amplified by a number of current trends, such as technological convergence, 
technological diversification, open innovation, and an increasing number of 
mergers, acquisitions, and divestments. Based on a comparative case study of 
Saab Automobile and Volvo Car Corporation, this paper describes the problem 
and suggests a framework for managing it. 
Author’s contribution: The study was designed jointly by the two co-authors, 
partly based on previous conceptual work on the reverse problem of IP assembly 
by Granstrand (1999, 2003). The data collection was mainly undertaken through 
interviews in which both authors took part, although some of the interviews were 
performed separately. The case descriptions were also summarized and written by 
the author of this thesis, while the general conceptual development, analysis, and 
writing of the rest of the paper was performed jointly by the two co-authors. The 
author of this thesis is the corresponding author of the paper. 
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5 Main results 
This chapter summarizes some of the main results in the appended papers as well 
as the frameworks, models, and tools that have been developed. The first section 
relates mainly to the first thesis purpose; to explore and explain strategic and 
innovation related intellectual property management practices and the managerial 
and economic consequences of such practices. The second section relates to the 
second thesis purpose; to develop managerial and economic frameworks, models, 
and tools to be used in the intersection between intellectual property management 
and open innovation practices. This chapter can only give a short summary of 
some of the most important results, and additional results and interpretations are 
available in the appended papers. 
5.1 Descriptive and explanatory results 
This section describes chosen parts of the wide range of descriptive and 
explanatory results on strategic IP management that is available in the appended 
papers. It is structured to transition from macro level quantitative data to micro 
level data in various forms, in order to give the reader a general overview of 
macro trends before moving over to firm level results. Firm-level explanations 
behind macro level trends are provided, and a number of cases are also described, 
including cases on IP governance, IP assembly, and IP disassembly, as well as a 
brief description of patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs. 
5.1.1 Background 
The pro-patent era emerged in the US in the 1980s following legal changes that 
strengthened the IP regime and the rights for patent holders. The creation of the 
CAFC in 1982 intended to stabilize and unify the US patent system, which was 
previously subject to unpredictability in rulings (especially in terms of 
enforceability) and forum shopping among the patentees and potential infringers 
(Merz & Pace, 1994). US patents became less likely to be invalidated after the 
establishment of the CAFC (Henry & Turner, 2006), leading to an increased 
number of patent litigations (Merz & Pace, 1994) and a surge in patenting in 
general (Granstrand, 1999; Hall, 2005; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). In addition, the 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 enabled universities, small businesses, and non-profit 
organizations to pursue ownership of patented inventions resulting from 
government-funded research, and this is an additional explanation for the increase 
in US patenting since the early 1980s (Mowery et al., 2001). More recently, a 
similar shift to (relatively more) pro-patent legislations has spurred patenting in 
China (Hu & Jefferson, 2009) and many other countries. However, national 
patenting in Sweden and other small European countries has not followed a 
similar path (as illustrated by Figure 2.2). 
Innovation and intellectual property 
52 
5.1.2 Internationalization of Swedish patenting 
Table 5.1 shows a number of different time series of patent applications related to 
Sweden. Figure 5.1 presents normalized graphs for the same time series, relating 
numbers to their equivalent for year 2000 in order to give an overview of the 
growth and/or decline in various types of application streams from 2000 to 
2010.33  
When studying and interpreting the patent statistics in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 it 
is important to consider three different perspectives. First, there is patent data 
relating to a demand for protection on a specific market. In the case of Sweden 
indications of this include not only the number of national Swedish applications34 
but also the number of EPO applications being validated in Sweden. While the 
number of Swedish national applications decreased in between 2000 and 2010, the 
number of EPO applications being validated in Sweden was roughly the same in 
2010 as in 2000, albeit with fluctuations in between. Second, there is patent data 
relating to the use of a specific PTO, indicating its workload and demand for its 
services. In the case of Sweden this includes not only the number of national 
Swedish applications, but also, for example, the number of PCT applications filed 
at the Swedish PTO and, perhaps more importantly, the use of the Swedish PTO 
as the International Searching Authority (ISA) for PCT applications (in two 
phases relating to a mandatory international search for prior art in phase I and an 
optional preliminary examination of patentability in phase II). The data gives an 
indication of a decreasing use of the Swedish PTO. Third, there is patent data 
relating to the productivity in terms of patent output from inventors/applicants in 
specific countries. This is indicated by the amount of various types of applications 
that are filed by applicants from those countries. While the number of Swedish 
national applications (to the Swedish PTO) from Swedish applicants decreased in 
the first decade of the 2000s, EPO and PCT applications from Swedish applicants 
increased. Consequently, Swedish innovators seem to have internationalized their 
patenting, by increasing the use of international patent application routes while 
decreasing the utilization of the Swedish national system. 
                                                 
 
33 Note that patent statistics are commonly adjusted, and some of the numbers in Table 5.1 
therefore differ marginally from what is presented in Paper I. Also note that patent statistics from 
different sources sometime differ marginally, such as statistics provided by WIPO as compared to 
statistics provided by national PTOs. 
34 The number of national Swedish applications includes the PCT applications that have proceeded 
to the national phase in Sweden. In the national phase, they are treated as national applications. 
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Table 5.1 Patent application streams related to Sweden (extended from Paper I) 
Application type1) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
National Swedish applications 4 938 4 625 4 870 4 920 4 460 3 882 3 604 3 216 2 943 2 845 2 881 2 777 2 604 2 549 
- from Swedish applicants2) - - - 4 135 3 789 3 308 3 003 2 728 2 498 2 429 2 517 2 386 2 151 2 195 
PCT applications filed globally 57 064 67 061 76 358 93 239 108 229 110 394 115 204 122 632 136 750 149 641 159 926 163 236 155 399 163 938 
PCT applications filed at the Swedish 
PTO 2 208 2 465 2 500 2 691 2 915 2 455 2 097 2 053 2 048 2 123 2 246 2 317 2 046 1 775 
- share of PCT applications filed 
globally 3.87% 3.68% 3.27% 2.89% 2.69% 2.22% 1.82% 1.67% 1.50% 1.42% 1.40% 1.42% 1.32% 1.08% 
PCT applications using the Swedish 
PTO as ISA for phase I - - - 3 976 4 273 3 987 3 522 3 334 3 366 3 150 3 160 2 407 2 042 2 050 
PCT applications using the Swedish 
PTO as ISA for phase II - - - 3 441 3 576 3 466 2 630 1 615 988 689 671 626 457 350 
PCT applications from Swedish 
applicants filed globally2) 2 212 2 589 2 715 3 090 3 422 2 989 2 606 2 851 2 884 3 336 3 655 4 137 3 567 3 313 
- share of PCT applications filed 
globally 3.88% 3.86% 3.56% 3.31% 3.16% 2.71% 2.26% 2.32% 2.11% 2.23% 2.29% 2.53% 2.30% 2.02% 
EPO applications3) 72 904 82 087 89 359 100 701 110 117 106 348 116 831 123 748 128 709 135 399 141 423 146 644 134 542 150 961 
EPO applications validated in Sweden - - - 8 455 6 798 12 077 13 225 12 317 10 892 11 980 10 565 10 063 9 185 8 844 
- from Swedish applicants2) - - - 236 227 339 487 470 397 413 447 419 356 437 
EPO applications from Swedish 
applicants2), 3) 1 455 1 742 1 977 2 314 2 536 2 545 2 591 2 487 2 516 2 540 2 738 3 134 3 147 3 560 
- share of EPO applications 2.00% 2.12% 2.21% 2.30% 2.30% 2.39% 2.22% 2.01% 1.95% 1.88% 1.94% 2.14% 2.34% 2.36% 
Notes: 1) The highest values (over time in each row) are written bold and the lowest values are underlined  
 2) “Swedish applicant” means Swedish first named applicant, who is not necessarily a Swedish inventor 
 3) Includes European applications and Euro-PCT applications entering the regional phase 
 
Source:  Swedish PTO statistics, WIPO-statistics, EPO Annual Reports 
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Figure 5.1 Normalized patent application streams (legend in order of normalized value for 2010, from highest to lowest) 
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EPO applications validated in Sweden from
Swedish applicants
PCT applications filed globally
EPO applications from Swedish applicants
EPO applications
PCT applications from Swedish applicants filed
globally
EPO applications validated in Sweden
PCT applications filed at the Swedish PTO
National Swedish applications from Swedish
applicants
National Swedish applications
PCT applications using the Swedish PTO as ISA
for phase I
PCT applications using the Swedish PTO as ISA
for phase II
Main results 
55 
All in all, the data in Table 5.1 and the graphs in Figure 5.1 indicate that the 
importance of the Swedish PTO decreased from the late 1990s to 2010, and 
probably also the importance of patent protection on the Swedish market for 
innovators around the world. Despite decreasing numbers of national Swedish 
patent applications, Swedish innovators and patentees did not necessarily decrease 
their patenting in general, as indicated by increasing numbers of international 
patent applications by Swedish applicants. However, the patenting strategies seem 
to have been internationalized [see also Paper I and Granstrand (forthcoming)]. 
5.1.3 Convergence of international patenting 
Looking at internationalization and globalization more broadly, it is on one hand 
possible that globalization in general leads to worldwide convergences of different 
types, for instance in terms of consumption and investment preferences (i.e., 
actors of different nationalities become increasingly similar). On the other hand it 
is possible that globalization and decreasing transaction costs leads to increasing 
specialization (i.e., actors of different nationalities focus on what they do best) 
due to economies of scale (Cantwell & Vertova, 2004; Krugman, 1987).35  
The results above indicate that patenting strategies have been internationalized for 
the case of Sweden and its innovators. A subsequent question is then if innovators 
of other nationalities also internationalize their patenting strategies, and, if so, 
whether the sets of preferred country markets for patent protection are becoming 
increasingly similar, i.e., whether there is market convergence globally in terms of 
preferred markets for patent protection. Another related question is whether the 
sets of technological areas (measured by patent classes) developed and patented 
by inventive firms/individuals around the world become increasingly similar, i.e., 
whether there is technology convergence globally. 
A number of concepts and distinctions are important in this context (see Paper 
III). First, the processes in which different nations and their inventors become 
increasingly similar in terms of their focus on various markets and technologies 
for patenting, respectively, are here denoted inter-national market convergence 
and inter-national technology convergence, since they denote processes in which 
the differences between nations decrease. The opposite processes, i.e., the 
processes of increasing differences, are denoted inter-national market 
specialization and inter-national technology specialization, respectively. Second, 
the processes in which a specific nation and its inventors focuses more narrowly 
                                                 
 
35 In this connection, it is important to separate between the consumer (demand) side and the 
producer (supply) side, since convergence in consumer preferences can for instance co-exist with 
specialization and increased trade among producers. 
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on a smaller set of markets and technologies for patenting (but not necessarily 
different markets and technologies than other nations) are denoted intra-national 
market specialization and intra-national technology specialization, respectively. 
The opposite processes, i.e., the processes in which a specific nation focuses 
wider on a larger set of markets and technologies, respectively, are denoted intra-
national market diversification and intra-national technology diversification. 
Inter-national convergence is here defined as a decrease in differences between 
countries in terms of patenting (while inter-national specialization is oppositely 
defined as an increase in differences), and in order to study inter-national 
convergence six difference indexes are introduced in Paper III, three for inter-
national market convergence and three for inter-national technology convergence. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is used as a measure of intra-national 
market/technology diversification/specialization.36 
Analysis of the market difference indexes (݀ெௌ, ݀ோெ஺, and ݀ோௌெ஺) shows that 
there is an inter-national market convergence; all three difference indexes 
decreased over time (see Table 5.2). This means that inventors from different 
nations around the world increasingly file patent applications in similar sets of 
nations. The results further show a decreasing concentration as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (ܪெ). This means that there is an intra-national 
market diversification, i.e., that inventors from different nations around the world 
widen their sets of output markets for patenting. 
In this development, it is likely that a general set of important nations for 
patenting will emerge among worldwide inventors, for example, the US in North 
America, France, Germany and the UK in Europe, and China, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan in Asia. An interview with a chief IP officer (CIPO) at a multinational 
corporation (MNC) with one of the largest patent portfolios in its business 
                                                 
 
36 The market-related indexes are based on all patent applications worldwide from 1995 through 
2004, as reported by WIPO.  The technology-related indexes use the US market as a reference 
market and are based on all national patent applications to the USPTO from 2005 through 2009. 
The time spans were chosen mainly based on the availability of data. The WIPO dataset typically 
lags for some countries, which is why an older time period had to be chosen for the market-related 
indexes than for the technology-related ones in order to avoid analyzing convergence based on an 
incomplete dataset. It is assumed that the US is a highly prioritized nation for foreign patenting, 
and that the distribution of US patents in various patent classes from inventors of a specific nation 
therefore mirrors the distribution of patents in general (not only US ones) over various patent 
classes by inventors in that nation. However, US patenting is of course not a perfect proxy for 
patenting in general. Nevertheless, using the US as a reference market in patent information 
analysis is common practice (e.g., Granstrand et al., 1997; Patel & Pavitt, 1994). 
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revealed that the selection of nations for patent protection in that firm was made 
based on the most important nations for production on one hand and the most 
important output market nations on the other hand. Patent protection for important 
R&D nations is less important, since R&D activities are less likely to be hit by 
suits and possible damage claims and injunctions.  
 
Table 5.2 Statistical results on market convergence and concentration (Paper III) 
Index n 1995 Mean 2004 Mean Mean change % Change 
Estimated median 
of change 
݀ெௌ 2080 0.65578 0.51853 -0.13724*** -20.93% -0.1647### 
݀ோெ஺ 2080 288.7 142.0 -146.61*** -50.81% -58.77### 
݀ோௌெ஺ 2080 22.825 18.787 -4.038*** -17.69% -4.047### 
ܪெ 65 0.4817 0.2996 -0.1821*** -37.80% -0.1548### 
Notes: 
* Mean change different from zero with 0.05 significance (paired t-test) 
** Mean change different from zero with 0.01 significance (paired t-test) 
*** Mean change different from zero with 0.001 significance (paired t-test) 
# Median change different from zero with 0.05 significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 
## Median change different from zero with 0.01 significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 
### Median change different from zero with 0.001 significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 
 
There is not as clear results regarding inter-national technology convergence (see 
Table 5.3). On one hand, some results indicate an inter-national technology 
specialization (݀ோ்஺). On the other hand, other results indicate an inter-national 
technology convergence (்݀ௌ). Considering how the different indexes are 
constructed (see Paper III), the varying results regarding inter-national technology 
convergence could be explained by a process in which the same technological 
fields are becoming increasingly important in different countries (in terms of 
patent quantity) at the same time as differences in relative technological 
specialization in the various fields (including minor technological areas in terms 
of patent quantity) are increasing. This process thus involves both technology 
convergence and specialization. Apart from the inter-national measures, the 
results indicate an intra-national technology diversification, meaning that nations 
around the world focus on a wider set of technologies. Note however that 
technology diversification does not necessarily imply business diversification, and 
that businesses might very well be concentrated and specialized while at the same 
time being supported by an increasing number of technologies (Gambardella & 
Torrisi, 1998; Granstrand & Oskarsson, 1994; Granstrand et al., 1997; Oskarsson, 
1993). 
To summarize sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, the patent data gives various indications of 
internationalized patenting strategies in general. The data shows a decreasing 
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importance for the Swedish PTO and the Swedish market for patent protection. 
Swedish inventors seem to have internationalized their patenting strategies. On 
the global level, different nations and their inventors focus on a wider but 
increasingly similar set of nation markets for patenting. Different nations and their 
inventors also focus on increasingly diversified sets of technologies, which are 
also to some extent becoming increasingly similar across nations.  
 
Table 5.3 Statistical results on technology convergence and concentration (Paper III) 
Index n 2005 Mean 2009 Mean Mean change % Change 
Estimated median 
of change 
்݀ௌ 3570 0.91999 0.89610 -0.02389*** -2.60% -0.01728### 
݀ோ்஺ 3570 609.0 681.3 72.3*** 11.87% -37.30### 
݀ோௌ்஺ 3570 65.628 65.768 0.140 0.21% 0.2758# 
ܪ்  85 0.2631 0.2021 -0.0610* -23.19% -0.01658# 
Notes: 
* Mean change different from zero with 0.05 significance (paired t-test) 
** Mean change different from zero with 0.01 significance (paired t-test) 
*** Mean change different from zero with 0.001 significance  (paired t-test) 
# Median change different from zero with 0.05 significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 
## Median change different from zero with 0.01 significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 
### Median change different from zero with 0.001 significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) 
 
5.1.4 A change in patenting strategies 
The decrease in Swedish national patenting during the 2000s as described above 
raises questions about the reasons for such a decline, possibly including increasing 
internationalization of patenting as indicated above. Results from a questionnaire 
survey among Swedish patentees are presented in Paper I and Table 5.4, and cast 
additional light on this issue. The questions focus on causes behind changes in the 
number of priority patent applications among the responding firms. A priority 
patent application (first filing) is the first patent application for a specific 
invention (which can then be followed by subsequent applications to other PTOs), 
and changes in the number of priority patent applications thus indicate changes in 
either R&D output or changes in patenting strategies. In contrast to changes in the 
number of all patent applications as studied above, changes in the number of 
priority patent applications do not incorporate changes in the number of protected 
nation markets for individual inventions. 
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Table 5.4 Explanatory factors behind a decrease and/or increase of first filings (priority patent applications) in different time periods (Paper I) 
Weights of various factors as explanations for a decrease in first filing 
applications (scale: 0 = no weight, 4 = of decisive weight) 1) 
Large 
patentees 
1998-2004 
Small 
patentees 
1998-2004 
Patent con-
sultancy firms 
2001-2005 2) 
Large 
patentees 
1998-2004 
Large 
patentees 
1990-1997 
Small 
patentees  
1990-1997 
Patent con-
sultancy firms  
1990-2000 2) 
Weights of various factors as explanations for an increase in first filing 
applications1) 
1. Reduction of R&D resources globally        1. Increase of R&D resources globally 
a. for business-trend reasons 1.55 0.82 1.38 1.36 1.33 1.90(2) 3.20(1) a. for business-trend reasons 
b. for other (e.g., structural) reasons 2.36(3) 1.55(3) 1.63(4) 2.15(5) 2.42(4) 1.80(3) 1.40 b. for other (e.g., structural) reasons 
2. Reduction of R&D resources in Sweden        2. Increase of R&D resources in Sweden 
a. for business-trend reasons 1.55 1.09 1.50(5) 1.18 1.09 1.56 3.20(1) a. for business-trend reasons 
b. for other (e.g., structural) reasons 2.27(4) 1.36 1.50(5) 2.25(3) 2.58(3) 1.70(4) 1.40 b. for other (e.g., structural) reasons 
3. Reduction of patenting resources        3. Increase of patenting resources 
a. globally 1.64 0.55 1.25 1.83 2.09 1.10 2.60 a. globally 
b. in Sweden 1.55 0.82 2.00(2) 2.58(2) 2.38(5) 1.56 2.80(5) b. in Sweden 
4. Decrease in number of patentable inventions per R&D dollar 1.27 1.45(5) 1.00 1.86 1.58 1.40 1.80 4. Increase in number of patentable inventions per R&D dollar 
5. Decrease of patenting propensity per patentable invention 1.73(5) 2.09(1) 1.38 2.15(5) 2.83(2) 2.10(1) 1.40 5. Increase of patenting propensity per patentable invention 
6. Increase of R&D in areas with fewer possibilities of patenting (e.g., 
R&D in areas with service or social-science orientation) 
0.55 0.36 0.88 1.77 1.83 0.89 1.40 6. Increase of R&D in areas with greater possibilities of patenting 
7. Change in patent application strategy in the form of:        7. Change in patent application strategy in the form of: 
a. More secrecy protection 0.78 0.40 0.88 0.83 0.67 0.78 1.20 a. Less secrecy protection 
b. More selective patenting 2.91(2) 1.55(3) 2.25(1) 1.33 1.83 1.00 2.40 b. Less selective patenting 
c. Increased demands on patent quality instead of patent quantity 3.09(1) 1.18 1.75(3) 1.17 1.67 0.89 2.40 c. Decreased demands on patent quality to the advantage of patent 
quantity 
8. Change in patents’ role and economic importance in the form of:        8. Change in patents’ role and economic importance in the form of: 
a. Lower economic value 0.40 0.91 0.63 2.18(4) 2.31 1.20 3.00(3) a. Higher economic value 
b. Less importance for financing of continued R&D 0.30 1.82(2) 0.75 1.27 1.58 1.10 2.80(5) b. Greater importance for financing of continued R&D 
c. Less strategic importance in the branch of industry 0.55 1.09 0.75 2.75(1) 2.92(1) 1.70(4) 3.00(3) c. Greater strategic importance in the branch of industry 
9. Higher total patent-application costs 1.64 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.42 1.30 0.40 9. Lower total patent-application costs 
10. The patents’ importance compared to other ways of exploiting an 
invention (secrecy, speed and efficiency in production and marketing etc.) 
has decreased 
1.09 1.00 0.88 1.92 2.00 1.20 1.80 10. The patents’ importance compared to other ways of exploiting an 
invention (secrecy, speed and efficiency in production and marketing 
etc.) has increased 
11. Other factors         
a. Disclosure through patents is more disadvantageous 0.55 0,55 0.75      
b. Change in the product range towards less patent-intensive products 1.00 0.82 0.75      
c. Shift in comprehensive product generations (e.g., 3G – 4G) 0.82 0.27 0.75      
d. Reduced government support to R&D 0.00 0.45 0.88      
e. Increased product specialization (i.e., less product diversification)  1.27 0.55 0.88      
f. Reduced risk of imitation 0.09 0.55 0.75      
Notes: 1) The five most important factors for each company group are marked in bold (ranking within parenthesis). 
2) While large patentees and small patentees were asked about first filings in general (FFs), the patent consultancy firms were asked about first filings to the Swedish PTO (SFFs). In addition, the patent consultancy firms were asked to specify factors 
behind a decrease during 2001-2005, compared to during 1998-2004 for large patentees and small patentees. 
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The results show that changes in R&D and patenting resources impact patenting 
frequency, confirming previous results (e.g., Scherer, 1983). In addition, a rise in 
the strategic importance of patents during the 1990s led to increased patenting, 
most probably partly as a result of macro level changes and the pro-patent era, 
while the decrease in patenting during the early 2000s is explained by more 
selective and more quality-oriented patenting, especially among large firms. This 
indicates that firms have adopted more efficient strategies, which goes in line with 
results by Ernst et al. (forthcoming) showing that proper patent management 
rather than patent quantity is conducive for firm success.  
Results from questions that are not reported in Table 5.4 (see Paper I) further 
confirm the picture of internationalized patenting (especially among large 
patentees) that emerged from the patent statistics above. The decrease in patenting 
in general combined with the increased internationalization of patenting then led 
to the sharp fall in Swedish national patenting during the 2000s. Similar causes 
could probably be found for the declines in national patenting among other small 
European countries [see also Paper I as well as SOU (2006) and Granstrand 
(forthcoming)]. 
5.1.5 IP governance and IP assembly – cases from mobile telecommunications 
The case of Nokia is a case in point of internationalized intellectual property 
management practices of a dominant technology-based MNC in a small country, 
in this case Finland (see Paper I). Nokia was one of the largest patentees 
worldwide around the millennium shift, and the company held the largest 
portfolio of patents related to the major mobile telecommunications standards (see 
Paper IV). In the early 1990s Nokia’s patenting had exploded as a result of 
disputes with Motorola and other large American firms. US patenting had caught 
up pace already in the early 1980s, partly due to the “patent wars” with Japanese 
firms (Granstrand, 1999). In the late 1980s and 1990s the aggressive strategies 
that were developed in these wars hit European firms, many of which at that time 
had not put sufficient emphasis on patents and IP management. This wakeup call 
led to Nokia starting to patent as much as possible in the early 1990s, partly to 
build retaliatory power, in turn leading to significant IP management learning. In 
the early 2000s (most probably as a result of the previous learning) this shifted to 
a focus on selective patenting with emphasis on quality instead of quantity, also 
with increased internationalization and use of the PCT system. 
Nokia is a case in point also of the IP developments in the innovation system 
related to mobile telecommunications systems more generally. Ericsson, Nokia, 
and other European telecommunications firms had in many aspects been driving 
the developments of GSM and other mobile telecommunications standards. 
Despite involving multiple actors and major investments, the innovation system 
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had been informally governed with limited patenting (see Paper IV). The case of 
the mobile telecommunications innovation system then illustrate how an 
innovation system initially characterized by implicit contracting and informal 
governance of technological resources is unstable and vulnerable to opportunistic 
strategy shifts of incumbents or new entrants that employ aggressive patenting 
strategies. There is typically no way to fight a patent but with a patent 
(Granstrand, 1999), and when Motorola entered the game, with aggressive 
patenting and enforcement, its European competitors quickly had to pick up pace 
in terms of their patenting to gain retaliation power, forcing the entire innovation 
system to move from informal to formal governance. Thus, emergences of pro-
patent eras do not only take place at national level (see Paper III), but also at 
industry level. Subsequently, after the shift to formal governance, the case 
illustrates the emergence of a number of strategies to deal with hold-up problems 
and transaction costs, including cross-licensing schemes, patent acquisitions, 
horizontal integration, and institutional setups in form of FRAND requirements on 
licensing. Thus, the case illustrates the importance for strategic IP management to 
deal with the IP assembly problem and tragedies of the anticommons, as well as 
different managerial solutions for enabling freedom to operate. 
5.1.6 The IP disassembly problem – cases from the automotive industry 
Another problem that strategic IP management must deal with is the IP 
disassembly problem (a concept coined in Paper VI), referring to the problem of 
separating and disintegrating IPRs for enabling a transaction or transfer of a part 
of a company, business, or project. Thus, the IP disassembly problem is of a 
reverse nature compared to the IP assembly problem. However, the IP 
disassembly problem could also be argued to consist of a number of assembly 
problems, since both the divesting unit and the divested unit must collect 
(assemble) the necessary rights in relation to each other to continue their 
businesses as separate units. Two cases of the management of IP disassembly 
problems in the automotive industry are reported here (see also Paper VI), the 
case of Saab Automobile and the case of Volvo Car Corporation (VCC). 
The automobile production of SAAB AB was initiated after the end of World War 
II, when the firm needed to diversify its business to offset decreasing airplane 
orders, which was its main business before that. SAAB AB later merged with 
another Swedish automotive firm, Scania-Vabis, under the name Saab-Scania. In 
the 1990s the Saab cars division, Saab Automobile, was divested in two 
subsequent steps and sold to General Motors (GM). This first divestment process 
did not present any major IP disassembly problems. There were not many large 
technological overlaps that were patented, so the few patents that were held by the 
firm could fairly easily be divided between Saab Automobile and Saab-Scania. 
The shared trademark had to be handled, however. This issue was solved by 
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trademark licenses to Saab Automobile, enabling the firm to use both the Saab 
name and the griffin logo. When Saab Automobile was integrated with GM, the 
technological interdependencies between the firm and its owner grew 
considerably, also since GM centralized its IP ownership in 2005. Thus, when 
Saab Automobile was to be divested from GM during 2008-2010, the IP 
disassembly problem became evident, also due to GM’s resistance to sell Saab 
Automobile to potential competitors. Nevertheless, a deal was finally closed with 
Spyker Cars in 2010, a deal which included licenses to the GM technologies that 
were necessary for running the business of Saab Automobile. However, these 
licenses included change of control clauses (CCCs), meaning that GM could 
terminate the license agreements in case of a change of control of Saab 
Automobile. After the acquisition by Spyker Cars the sales of cars did not pick up 
pace fast enough, leading to continued losses within the firm. In order to finance 
the ongoing business, Spyker Cars needed to raise capital, implying a change of 
control of Saab Automobile. However, GM clearly stated its intention to execute 
the termination rights in the CCCs, limiting both financing and exit opportunities, 
and Saab Automobile eventually had to file for bankruptcy in the late 2011. Thus, 
in the acquisition from GM, Spyker Cars had not sufficiently disentangled Saab 
Automobile from its previous owner, clearly illustrating the potentially severe 
consequences of the IP disassembly problem. 
The case of VCC has many resemblances with the case above. AB Volvo started 
automobile production in 1926/1927 as a unit within the Swedish bearing 
manufacturer SKF. In 1935 AB Volvo was divested and listed on the Swedish 
stock exchange, and the firm diversified into trucks, buses, construction 
equipment, marine engines, and aircraft engines. In 1999, AB Volvo divested its 
passenger cars business, VCC, to Ford. The IP disassembly problem was handled 
by a review process in which the IP was sorted according to its main belonging (to 
passenger cars or to something else). IP, and mainly patents, that clearly related to 
passenger cars were transferred to Ford while the rest were kept within AB Volvo. 
Any dependence on IP kept within AB Volvo was cleared by a collective license 
stipulating that VCC and Ford could keep using all IP that was used by VCC at 
the time of the divestment. The trademarks of joint importance were handled 
separately and put in a holding company co-owned by AB Volvo and Ford/VCC. 
Roughly a decade after the purchase, Ford initiated a divestment process of VCC 
in connection with the financial crisis and economic downturn around 2008, 
similar to GM and Saab Automobile. Ford had already divested Aston Martin, 
Jaguar, and Land Rover, and was therefore well prepared to handle the IP 
disassembly problem. The trademark issues could be easily handled by 
transferring Ford’s share of the trademark holding company to VCC. The 
technological IP was categorized according to where it was developed (within 
VCC or within the rest of Ford) and according to its importance to Ford. This 
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categorization was then matched by different IP transfers and IP license 
agreements (see Paper VI), solving the IP disassembly problem. Compared to GM 
and Saab Automobile, Ford’s divestment of VCC was less pressured by time and 
separation agreements could be established ex ante, limiting transaction costs and 
hold-ups in connection to negotiation with the preferred buyer Geely Holding 
Group, who finally acquired VCC in 2010. 
These cases illustrate not only the existence of the IP disassembly problem, but 
also some of its causes and potential consequences. It is likely that, with 
increasing technological complexity, diversification, and interrelatedness, the 
problem will increase in both importance and frequency in conjunction with the 
ensuing need to conduct various forms of open innovation (e.g., MADs, JVs). 
This will then probably lead to increased transaction costs and potential hold-ups, 
if not matched by improved management. It is clear that while the presence of 
IPRs here constitutes a problem, IP-related contracts such as licenses are also part 
of the solution. The cases then illustrate such remedies, and these will be further 
discussed in section 5.2.2. 
5.1.7 Patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs 
This chapter has hitherto had an implicit focus on large firms. Previous research 
has showed that IP management in SMEs is quite different from that in large firms 
(e.g., Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Chabchoub & 
Niosi, 2005; Friesike et al., 2009; Iversen, 2003; Keupp et al., 2009; Mansfield, 
1986), a difference that has not yet been sufficiently explained. Paper II addresses 
this gap by studying patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs. The empirical 
findings, summarized in Table 5.5, point at low patent competence among the 
studied firms, and limited resources for monitoring and enforcing their patents, 
leading to a limited protective function of the patents. Therefore, patenting was 
not primarily undertaken to deter imitation, contrasting previous studies (Arundel 
et al., 1995; Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2000; Duguet & Kabla, 1998; 
Granstrand, 1999; Keupp et al., 2009; Thumm, 2004). However, many of the 
entrepreneurial SMEs used patents for attracting customers (using patents as 
marks of the inventions’ / products’ qualities), and in the subsample of hi-tech 
SMEs patents were crucial for attracting venture capital (VC). Albeit contrasting 
previous results, these motives for patenting are in line with some of the main 
issues that entrepreneurial SMEs typically deal with; to find customers and to 
survive financially (Storey & Tether, 1998). 
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Table 5.5 Results on patent management in entrepreneurial SMEs (Paper II) 
Sub-study Type of firms Empirical results 
Entrepreneurial hi-
growth SMEs 
Service as well as 
manufacturing firms 
of different ages 
Most firms were not active in patenting 
Patent competence was low 
Patenting was of little or no perceived importance since a majority of 
the firms were not based on patentable innovations 
When available, patents were used for customer marketing purposes 
When used for customer marketing, the protective function of patents 
is not important and one patent per product is therefore enough 
SMEs do not have enough resources for monitoring and enforcing 
patents 
Costs and disclosure of information are main drawbacks with patenting
Patents are not prerequisites for high growth 
Entrepreneurial hi-
tech SMEs 
Young (below 
twelve years) hi-tech 
firms within 
mechanical, 
electrical, computer, 
and chemical (and 
biotech) engineering 
The firms were active in patenting and technical inventions were of 
major importance for firm growth 
Patent competence was low 
Patents were of little perceived importance for competitiveness and 
growth 
Patents were of major importance for attracting investors/financiers 
Patents were used for customer marketing purposes 
SMEs do not have enough resources for monitoring and enforcing 
patents 
Costs and disclosure of information are main drawbacks with patenting
Entrepreneurial 
region 
Old firms (above 30 
years) within 
mechanical and 
materials 
engineering 
The firms were active in patenting 
The larger firms had more patenting resources and competence than 
the smaller ones 
The larger firms also put more trust than the smaller ones on patents’ 
ability to deter imitation and patents were of more importance for their 
competitiveness 
When internal patent resources were removed, the efficient and 
effective use of the patent system became limited 
Patents were used for customer marketing purposes 
SMEs do not have enough resources for monitoring and enforcing 
patents 
Product quality and related manufacturing techniques and process 
technologies (protected by trade secrets) were more important for 
competitiveness than product patents 
Patents were perceived unnecessary by some of the SMEs, and 
imitation was instead met by outstanding inventiveness and 
entrepreneurial spirit  
A low inventive step requirement is a drawback for SMEs 
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5.2 Prescriptive results for IP management in open innovation 
IP management and patent protection have often been assumed to be closely 
linked to the “closed innovation paradigm”, aiming to protect technologies that 
have been developed in-house to enable high (monopolistic) margins on 
innovative products and services that are commercialized by in-house production 
and sales. However, this is an all too simplified picture as it misses out the 
relation between IP and innovation openness, and this interrelatedness has in 
recent years caught increasing attention (e.g., Alexy et al., 2009; Bader, 2006). IP 
and open innovation are not at all contradicting; IP is rather at the core for many 
types of open innovation, such as technology trade, licensing, and collaborative 
R&D, but developments in IP management are needed to decrease the related 
transaction costs. 
5.2.1 Managing innovation openness 
To understand the role of IP in open innovation, it is first necessary to understand 
what open innovation actually is. The research literature provides a range of 
definitions, typically referring to innovation activities or processes crossing some 
form of organizational boundary (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003), although some 
definitions focus on innovations’ characteristics in terms of non-excludability 
(e.g., Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011). Technological innovation processes then 
include invention processes which result in new technologies, and 
commercialization processes which lead to market sales or in-house use of these 
new technologies (see section 2.1 and Figure 5.2). These processes are supported 
by resources ܴ (Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972) that may include human 
resources, financial resources, physical resources, background knowledge, etc. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The innovation process 
 
Considering the wide range of definitions of open innovation it is clearly not a 
one-dimensional concept, and a multidimensional framework of innovation 
openness is developed to better understand the different dimensions of it. The first 
dimension of innovation openness, as identified in Paper IV, refers to the 
distribution of resources involved in the innovation process, ܴ ൌ 	ܴ௜௡௩ 	൅	ܴ௖௢௠, 
over few or many resource holders (e.g., Granstrand et al., 1997; von Hippel, 
2007). The second dimension refers to the governance of the technological 
resources, ߬, being developed in the innovation process. The governance mode 
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relates to whether the focal technology is governed by explicit contracting 
enforceable by law, implicit contracting enforceable by markets (Klein et al., 
1978) or social norms (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999), or (possibly) no 
contracting at all. The mode of governance is important, since it impacts 
appropriability as well as tradability within the innovation system. The third and 
final dimension refers to the accessibility of the invented technologies, ߬, denoting 
how easy or cheaply the technology can be accessed and used by agents other than 
inventors and/or technology owners/holders. Thus, an innovation system can, 
deliberately or not, be designed to allow for access and use of technologies by 
external actors to various extents. The framework is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Note 
that this framework uses innovations as the unit of analysis rather than firms. See 
Paper IV for more details. 
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Figure 5.3 Framework for innovation openness (Paper IV) 
 
With the framework for innovation openness at hand, it is clear that IP 
management has an important role to play in open innovation (as well as in many 
other management areas, increasingly being penetrated by IP issues). For 
example, IP can be managed to enable high excludability and high direct returns 
from product or service sales, or to enable low excludability leading to cumulative 
and complementary innovations and indirect returns from complementary sales. 
Formal contracting is then typically less vulnerable to opportunistic strategy shifts 
among incumbents or new actors, as illustrated by the case of mobile 
telecommunications in section 5.1.5, and an important question for IP 
management is if and how to set up IP-based contracts to formally govern, 
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coordinate, and incentivize actions and actors in the innovation system. A special 
case of this is dealt with in section 5.2.2, while section 5.2.3 deals with another 
pressing issue for IP management, namely how to divide the value created and 
captured by the innovation system among the involved resource holders. 
5.2.2 Managing the IP disassembly problem 
The IP disassembly problem is introduced in section 5.1.6 in connection with 
cases from the automotive industry, and refers to the problem of separating and 
disintegrating IPRs for enabling a transaction or transfer of a part of a company, 
business, or project. The IP disassembly problem occurs when disintegrating two 
or more units of some form, thus shifting from a more to a less integrated 
organizational form, for instance by divesting a unit from a parent firm or by 
terminating a joint R&D venture. IP management must then provide a solution 
that enables the disintegrated units to continue their businesses as separate units, 
despite the fact that IPRs are spread across multiple agents. Paper VI provides a 
general framework for managing the IP disassembly problem in case of a 
divestment. This framework is presented in Figure 5.4, and the approach is to 
structure the IP related to the divestment in accordance with its importance for the 
selling firm and for the business for sale, respectively, resulting in a number of 
combinations. These combinations are then matched with different types and 
combinations of various provisions, including IP ownership transfers, IP licenses, 
and IP holding JVs.  
The distribution of access and control of IP (cf. section 5.2.1) by the use of 
various contract provisions should preferably be matched with the distribution of 
techno-economic importance across the actors. An IP of core importance to the 
business for sale but of non-core importance to the selling firm should for instance 
be transferred to the business for sale in order to move the main control of the IP 
to the agent to whom it is of most importance, while the selling firm receives a 
license to the IP. These provisions can be fine-tuned to deal with various issues, 
such as uncertainty and dynamics (for instance in terms of varying importance of 
IP over time, as illustrated in the figure) by stipulating CCCs, grant-back clauses, 
sub-licensability, etc. (see Paper VI). All of this is subject to pricing and 
negotiation, however, which is illustrated by the case of Saab Automobile (see 
section 5.1.6).37 
  
                                                 
 
37 Note that “on-diagonal” combinations are difficult to handle, and especially IP of core 
importance for both actors. Note also that this framework has not listed all contractual options, but 
rather the most important generic types. 
Innovation and intellectual property 
68 
Importance for selling  
firm (SF) 
Importance for  
business for sale (BFS) 
Core  Non‐core  No importance 
 
 
Core  License 
IP holding JV 
Transfer to / keep 
with BFS and  
license to SF 
Transfer to /  
keep with BFS 
Non‐core 
Transfer to / keep 
with SF and  
license to BFS 
License 
IP holding JV 
Transfer to /  
keep with BFS 
No importance  Transfer to /  
keep with SF 
Transfer to / keep 
with SF 
Divest 
License to 3rd party 
Store 
Figure 5.4 Framework for managing the IP disassembly problem with dynamics over time t 
(Paper VI) 
 
5.2.3 Proper IP pricing and value sharing 
Designing IP contract provisions, for instance as discussed above, is one 
important issue for IP management in open innovation. An equally important 
issue is how to price IP and share value across multiple stakeholders. Establishing 
fair and reasonable principles for value sharing has potential to decrease 
negotiations and transaction costs, leading to increased efficiency for both 
markets and quasi-integrated organizational forms such as partnerships. Fairness 
is a difficult concept however, and establishing new principles of fairness itself 
falls outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, the most common prevailing fairness 
principle in contemporary business is used to derive a model for determining 
FRAND royalties, namely the one that says that returns from a stock company 
should be divided among its shareholders according to their shares of the firm, 
i.e., according to their amount of invested capital. If applying the same principle 
to a licensing deal, the rate of ROI of the licensor(s) should equal the rate of ROI 
of the licensee(s), enabling the development of a multilateral investment-based 
method for determining FRAND royalties (see Paper V): 
  
t  t 
t 
t 
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ܮ௜௞ ൌ ቆߨ௢௣್೔ െ
ܫ௕೔
ܫ௕∙ ൅ ܫ௦∙
ߨ௢௣್∙ቇ
ܫ௦ೖ
ܫ௦∙
			,				ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ 
ܮ௜௞ = license royalty to be paid by licensee ݅ to licensor ݇ 
ߨ௢௣್೔  = operating profit of licensee ݅ 
ߨ௢௣್∙  = total operating profit of all licensees 
ܫ௕೔ = investment of licensee ݅ 
ܫ௕∙ = total investments of all licensees 
ܫ௦ೖ = investment of licensor ݇ 
ܫ௦∙ = total investments of all licensors 
While providing a simple and fair (in some sense) method for royalty 
determination, this model also suffers from its simplicity since licensing cases in 
practice might involve technologies with investments and operating profits that 
are difficult to separate from the ones of other technologies. However, 
adjustments can be made to the model to account for this, as described in Paper V. 
It can then also be argued that a FRAND model, like the one above, should be 
used as base case for further adjustments despite its limitations, rather than simple 
rules of thumb, such as the 25% rule of thumb (Goldscheider, 2011, 2012). That 
rule essentially says that a licensee should pay 25% of the related profits to the 
licensor, and thus lacks any connection to what could be viewed as fair in most 
cases, not the least in multilateral licensing. 
Further, the investment-based method proposed above benefits from aligning the 
objective functions (profits) of the licensor(s) and licensee(s), meaning that there 
is less risk for opportunism by moral hazard (hidden action). There is however a 
risk for another type of opportunism in that the licensor(s) and/or licensee(s) can 
overestimate their investment levels and underestimate their profit levels in 
relation to other actors in order to impact royalty payments, and this needs to be 
monitored. 
Similar to the situation with IP contracting in various forms, much advancement 
in the area of royalty determination and IP pricing is yet to come. The investment-
based method for determining FRAND royalties then provides a first step in a 
promising direction towards fair models based on economic rationale. 
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6 Discussion 
Strategic management of technological IP refers to formulating and executing 
strategies related to technological IP, including (1) how to acquire and create IP, 
(2) how to govern IP, and (3) how to exploit and extract value from IP. Figure 6.1 
relates these different elements of strategic management of technological IP to the 
technology base of a focal firm by building on a framework of generic technology 
acquisition and exploitation strategies by Granstrand (e.g., Granstrand, 1982; 
2010; Granstrand & Sjölander, 1990) and on TCT (Williamson, 1996). Different 
strategies to acquire and create technological IP include internal R&D, acquisition 
of innovative projects, units, or firms, joint ventures, technology in-licensing 
and/or purchasing, and technology scanning and intelligence. Different strategies 
to exploit and extract value from IP include internal exploitation (in-house 
production and marketing), creation and/or sales of innovative projects, units, or 
firms, joint ventures, technology out-licensing and/or sales. Additionally, IP can 
be stored without exploitation, or possibly leak. These strategies for IP acquisition 
and exploitation, respectively, can be ordered in accordance with their level of 
organizational integration (Granstrand, 2010), with the opposite then representing 
some form of “openness”.38 
Figure 6.1 relates the different strategies to the empirical and/or conceptual focus 
of the various appended papers. Paper IV has a wide focus on different forms of 
innovation openness, and it is therefore not surprising that it has relations to most 
of the strategies for acquiring and exploiting IP in Figure 6.1. Other examples 
include Paper II, focusing mainly on internal R&D and internal exploitation, 
Paper V, focusing mainly on licensing, and Paper VI, focusing mainly on 
corporate transactions (acquisitions and sales of innovative firms). All in all, this 
thesis covers most generic IP acquisition and exploitation strategies in Figure 6.1, 
albeit to various extent. Additionally, Paper III and to some extent Paper I are 
related to the institutional environment which has close interdependencies with IP 
strategies (see below). 
 
                                                 
 
38 Note that while Figure 6.1 illustrates a situation for a focal firm, Figure 5.3, presenting the 
innovation openness framework from Paper IV, illustrates a situation for a focal innovation or set 
of innovations. 
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Figure 6.1 Elements of strategic management of technological IP (with parentheses 
indicating relations to the appended papers) 
 
Firm-level IP governance is an overarching element of strategic IP management. 
The concept of governance is subject to ambiguity, but could be thought of “as an 
institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of 
transactions, is decided” aiming to “effect good order” and “workable 
arrangements” (Williamson, 1996, p. 11). Governance can relate to different 
levels, such as the governance of an innovation system or the governance of a 
firm within an innovation system (Andersen, 2006; Granstrand, 2006b), and is 
“the means by which order is accomplished in a relation in which potential 
conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains” 
(Williamson, 1996, p. 12, emphasis in original). 
Firm-level IP governance, which is the focus here, includes how to control and 
coordinate the technological IP of firms. This element is then interdependent with 
strategies for both IP acquisition and IP exploitation. As an example, technology 
out-licensing is easier to undertake with IP controlled by patents than with IP 
controlled solely by trade secrets. Thus, an out-licensing strategy both impacts 
and is impacted by the sort of control that is used for the relevant IP. Firm-level IP 
governance also includes monitoring and enforcing IPRs. Additionally, it relates 
to the accessibility of the technology base for outside agents, which is illustrated 
by the various types of boundaries for different sets of IP in Figure 6.1. The 
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explicit focus on firm-level does not mean that interactions between firms and 
interorganizational relationships are excluded from the concept. On the contrary, 
firm-level IP governance, as any type of governance, is always incorporating an 
agent’s relations to other agents. Therefore, firm-level IP governance is closely 
related to innovation openness. This is further discussed in section 6.2. 
Two important parts of firm-level IP governance are of special interest for this 
thesis: (a) IP contracting and (b) IP pricing and value sharing (see also section 
5.2). Papers I-IV and VI relate to IP contracting of various types (propertization of 
intellectual resources through various informal and formal means, contractual 
designs between agents, etc.), while mainly Papers IV-V relate to IP pricing and 
value sharing (e.g., royalty determination). 
As illustrated by Figure 6.1, IP governance is related to macro level factors and 
the institutional environment, such as available IPR systems (e.g., laws) for 
different types of technologies, enforcement systems (e.g., courts), and other 
policies (e.g., incentive systems), but also norms and customs. Thus, the element 
of firm-level IP governance depends on the institutional environment (see also 
Williamson, 1996). This is further discussed in section 6.1. 
When incorporating IP management into the framework for acquisition and 
exploitation of the technology base of a firm, questions arise regarding the 
boundary of the firm. Intellectual resources, not being tied to physical objects, can 
be acquired, created, controlled, and exploited by multiple agents simultaneously 
and also independently (e.g., by independent, simultaneous discovery or 
invention). Additionally, intellectual resources can be controlled by multiple 
agents, raising uncertainties about ownership. In a similar fashion as RBT 
(Penrose, 1959), PRT says that a firm is composed by the resources it owns 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986), defining the owner as the holder of the residual rights. 
Since intellectual resources might span organizational boundaries (see Figure 6.1), 
for instance due to shared or unclear ownership or weak enforceability (as 
illustrated by the SMEs in Paper II), the boundaries of firms become blurred. This 
issue is further discussed in section 6.3. 
A number of important aspects are naturally left out from the figure for simplicity 
reasons. Two left out aspects can be mentioned here. The important connection 
between IP management and general management is not explicitly illustrated in 
the figure. Strategic management of technological IP is an important part of 
(strategic) technology management, which in turn is an important part of 
general/corporate management. The second aspect left out is the 
interdependencies between the strategic IP management of the focal firm and the 
IP management of other agents (see, e.g., Paper IV). IP issues are always handled 
in relation to others. Both IP acquisitions and IP exploitations involve outside 
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agents, and the governance of IP always relates to other agents, as described 
above. 
6.1 Institutions, governance, and learning 
In connection to increasing internationalization and globalization, including 
internationalized patenting strategies as identified in Papers I and III, firms have 
started to rely upon an increasing number of different institutions across the globe. 
Although large differences still exist across nations, some of these institutions, 
such as patent and copyright laws, have been subject to harmonization efforts 
since decades and even centuries in some cases (Granstrand, 1999, 2003). These 
harmonization efforts have been pushed by, for instance, the WTO and interest 
organizations such as the International Association for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (AIPPI). Harmonization then refers both to harmonization of 
laws and to harmonization of law enforcement, law adherence, and court practices 
(see Paper III).  
The institutional environment in a nation has important implications for the 
management of firms on that nation market (Porter, 1990). The national IPR 
system can be used for promoting nationalistic interests and the management of 
the system is thus of importance for the competitiveness of the nation and its 
firms. In that context, the competitiveness of the nation’s firms relative foreign 
firms might be more important to promote when designing IPR systems than the 
dynamic and static competition among firms in general. Strong and weak IP 
regimes might therefore be of different use throughout the industrialization 
process of a country.  Weak IP regimes are then typically useful when catching up 
while strong IP regimes are typically more beneficial when forging ahead, at least 
in certain industries. Therefore, IPR systems typically co-evolve with the level of 
industrialization in the country (see also Paper III). 
Changes in IP regimes and institutions are currently occurring in China and India, 
essentially strengthening the protection of IP. Chinese and Indian firms and 
inventors are increasingly active in worldwide patenting (Paper III). Both 
countries have set targets on highest political levels to become innovation-based 
nations until year 2020, and IP issues are set high on the agenda. As an example, 
Chinese patentees are financially rewarded when applying for patents, a measure 
taken to spur Chinese patenting. Doubts have been raised regarding the quality of 
Chinese and Indian patents (just as the Japanese patent quality was once doubted), 
and such doubts might very well be justified in the short run. In the longer run the 
quality of current patent applications is secondary, however, since both China and 
India engage in learning processes that will likely lead to increased quality of 
technologies, innovations, and patents, similar to what has happened in other 
nations (e.g., Sweden) where pro-patent eras have emerged. The use of utility 
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model systems (complementing the patent systems), enabling a simpler, cheaper, 
and weaker type of patents, can further spur the learning process (Kim et al., 
2012). Such a system is in place in China, and India is currently discussing 
whether or not to introduce a similar one. Spillovers from foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) in these countries will likely be conducive for the learning 
process as well (Cheung & Lin, 2004). Learning then occurs both in relation to 
how institutions should be designed (e.g., Kim et al., 2012) and in relation to how 
IP should be managed within an institutional environment (e.g., Keupp et al., 
2010), and these issues co-evolve. IP management continuously adapt to 
institutional changes (e.g., van Zeebroeck et al., 2009), and institutional designs 
need to adapt to changes on firm level. These changes may in turn relate to 
foreign institutions, as exemplified by the consequences for the Swedish PTO 
from the increased use of foreign and international institutions, and thereby 
decreased use of domestic institutions, by Swedish patentees (see Paper I). 
There are then different phases of learning IP management, as indicated by Paper 
I for the case of patenting. In a first phase, characterized by learning-by-doing, 
patenting is steeply increasing after the recognition of its importance. As firms 
and patentees gain knowledge about patenting, focus shifts to more selective, 
quality-oriented, and resource efficient patenting through a second phase of 
learning.39 Earlier findings also support the argument that patenting is learnt over 
time, although the sources of learning are unclear (Mowery et al., 2002). 
The internationalized and converging patenting behaviors as identified in Papers I 
and III, be they emergent or deliberate strategy developments, will likely lead to 
an increasing number of competitive IP encounters, such as license offers, 
infringement litigations, and hold-up problems, between firms of different 
nationalities. Thus, firms need to develop international IP management skills, 
adapted to various institutions, to mitigate transaction costs as they become 
increasingly diversified across markets and technologies and are subject to an 
increasing number of international competitive IP encounters. These encounters 
are then also sources for inter-organizational learning, and they will therefore 
likely further spur management convergence through knowledge transfer and 
competitive exclusion of inferior management. In addition to such consequences, 
the internationalization leads to higher requirements on IP management skills, and 
it could therefore further increase the relative disadvantage of SMEs, since they 
often have too few resources for IP management (Paper II).  
                                                 
 
39 Further developments (subsequent phases) are yet to be identified. 
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6.2 IP management and open innovation 
Strategic management of technological IP is (probably) always related to issues of 
innovation openness. In fact, one of the main purposes of a patent system is to 
stimulate the disclosure and diffusion of new knowledge, as described in section 
2.2. On the strategic level, all three elements of strategic IP management in Figure 
6.1 are related to innovation openness, as argued below. 
First, strategic management of technological IP partly deals with controlling 
technologies and the accessibility to them (Paper IV) by firm-level IP governance. 
Technologies, being a subset of knowledge in general, are impure public goods 
(Stiglitz, 1999), and one important issue for IP management is then to handle the 
excludability dimension of technological resources; what degree of excludability 
(or oppositely accessibility) should be related to specific technologies. This 
dimension can be controlled by various forms of informal or formal IP 
governance, or in other terms implicit or explicit contracting (Klein et al., 1978). 
Formal IP governance, by the use of patents, copyrights, explicit contracts, etc., is 
then not limited to enable exclusivity, as is commonly assumed, but can also 
enable and ensure accessibility to innovations, as illustrated by open source 
software and the use of the General Public License (GPL). Open source software 
relies not only on formal governance through various license agreements to ensure 
high accessibility, but also on informal governance through social norms that are 
of importance for enforcing the GPL (O'Mahony, 2003), and these different forms 
of governance are often complements rather than substitutes. 
Informal governance of technologies and innovation openness is however likely 
vulnerable to opportunistic actions of other agents (Paper IV). Since informal 
governance (implicit contracting) relies upon enforcement by markets (Klein et 
al., 1978), recurrent contracting may mitigate some of these problems. However, 
recurrent contracting might eventually lead to asset specificities and small-
numbers conditions, again possibly leading to opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 
1983, 1985), for instance in cases of cumulative and complex technologies with 
high invent-around costs in which an inventor can switch to formal governance 
and patent its inventions to create a hold-up position. This is illustrated by the 
case of mobile telecommunications in Paper IV. Such a strategic move will then 
likely force other actors to also move to formal governance in order to create 
retaliatory power, in turn possibly leading to increasing integration due to 
increasing (market) transaction costs and hold-up problems (Hart, 1995).  
Opportunism is however not limited to informal governance. Hold-up problems 
can emerge when the bargaining power is very skew, as exemplified by the post-
divestment relation between GM and Saab Automobile in Paper VI. Another, 
more extreme, example is when a non-producing entity (NPE) holds a patent 
necessary to a producing firm (e.g., Ewing & Feldman, 2012). The NPE has no 
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business that could be harmed by retaliation, and can without risk create severe 
hold-up costs for the producing firm in order to maximize licensing revenues or 
damages. Part of the solution to this problem is tools for FRAND royalty 
determination, which is central also in open innovation in general since value 
needs to somehow be shared across multiple actors (Paper V). Proper tools for 
calculating FRAND royalties are thus important for both open innovation 
initiatives and courts.  
Courts are then important for enforcing FRAND and other principles, and in the 
longer run the principles enforced by courts will likely spread to markets, leading 
to an increased share of market solutions to hold-up problems, infringement cases, 
and IP assembly problems, and thereby fewer court cases and lower transaction 
costs. It is likely that immature technological areas are subject to relatively more 
court cases than mature ones, since court cases are needed to establish the “rules 
of the game” (North, 1990; Williamson, 1996), for instance in terms of what 
rights the IPRs actually give to its owner. If courts rely upon predictable, visible, 
and transparent principles, those principles will likely transfer to the market faster 
than if they are difficult to see and/or understand. Thus, courts have an important 
role to play in mitigating transaction costs on the market and enabling various 
forms of open innovation (see also Eggertsson, 1990). Similarly, firms and 
markets can create institutions that mitigate transaction costs, such as ETSI and 
FRAND principles in the case of mobile telecommunications (see Paper IV). 
Second, strategic management of technological IP deals with the acquisition of 
technological IP to the firm, or in other terms inbound open innovation 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Enkel et al., 2009; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Such 
acquisition can refer both to acquiring technological capabilities that enable new 
business opportunities in combination with resources already available internally, 
and to mitigating the IP assembly problem by enabling freedom to operate. The 
former is then related to value creation by enabling new combinations of 
technologies and other resources (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999; Penrose, 1959; Porter, 
1985; Schumpeter, 1934), while the latter is related to mitigating tragedies of the 
anticommons (Heller, 1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998), and these processes are 
often related and combined (e.g., Paper VI). 
A related issue is that new and improved markets for technologies and IP (e.g., 
Benassi & Di Minin, 2009) enable new forms of IP management. Besides 
providing a source of technologies, such markets can enable defendants to buy 
retaliatory power “off the shelf”, meaning that in-house invention and patenting 
for retaliatory purposes could possibly decrease, while patent purchasing would 
probably increase. In an infringement case in 2012 in which Yahoo (plaintiff) 
accused Facebook (defendant) for patent infringement, Facebook counterclaimed 
that Yahoo was infringing ten of Facebook’s patents. Eight of these ten patents 
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had been purchased by Facebook with the sole purpose to gain retaliatory power, 
according to Yahoo. This case eventually ended with a settlement, probably under 
terms much different from what Yahoo had hoped.40 
Third, strategic management of technological IP deals with the exploitation of 
technological IP through various channels, or in other terms various forms of 
outbound open innovation (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Enkel et al., 2009; 
Tranekjer & Knudsen, 2012). IP management then provides new 
commercialization channels for firms (Chesbrough, 2003). These can enable IP 
value extraction and commercialization on markets and/or for applications that 
would be economically infeasible to undertake by in-house production and 
marketing, leading to additional value for both inventors and customers. 
As described above, IP management must deal with these issues by providing 
(implicit or explicit) contractual solutions to the acquisition and exploitation of IP 
(e.g., Papers IV and VI) and pricing and value sharing principles (e.g., Paper V). 
There is a multitude of IPR contracts available [see, e.g., Bogers et al. (2012) for 
various generic licensing schemes], and there is also most likely a multitude of 
IPR contracts that will or can be designed to better govern various types of open 
innovation. Papers IV-VI provide frameworks, models, and tools that contribute 
to this area, but much more research is needed. This is further discussed below. 
6.3 IP management and economic organization 
While the preceding section focused on the relation between IP management and 
open innovation, this section focuses on the relation between IP management and 
economic organization more generally, albeit with close connections to innovation 
openness. Both RBT and PRT place resources at the core of the firm, essentially 
saying that the firm consists of the resources (assets) it owns (Grossman & Hart, 
1986; Penrose, 1959).41 Ownership can then be defined as control of residual 
rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986). Since strategic IP management partly deals with 
the control of technological resources, as described above, IP management clearly 
has direct implications for the boundaries of firms, as identified by PRT and RBT.  
However, considering the uncertainties surrounding the control of IP, for instance 
in terms of validity and enforceability of IPRs, the boundary of the firm is subject 
to uncertainties and ambiguity. Additionally, even when ownership is clear, 
strategic IP management can be directed for the firm to tap into external resources 
                                                 
 
40 See, for example, Ewing (2012) for a more detailed account on this case. 
41 Note however that Penrose (1959) expresses concerns related to the ambiguity of the concept of 
the firm. 
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by the use of various strategies (see, e.g., Figure 6.1), related to various degrees of 
integration, also subject to uncertainties due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) 
and incomplete/imperfect contracting (Coase, 1988; Hart, 1995; Williamson, 
1985, 1996). Thus, when technological resources are involved, or intellectual 
resources more generally, the boundaries of the firm are unclear, and subject to 
strategic IP management decisions. This places IP management at core for general 
management, and IP strategies must thus be integrated with general corporate 
strategies.42  
Developments and learning in three interdependent IP-related areas can be 
identified as of importance for economic organization (see also section 6.1). First, 
technological developments and learning (for instance in ICTs and transportation 
technologies) impact transaction costs, both on the market and within the firm 
(management costs). It is difficult to say, however, whether these technological 
changes will persistently promote integration or disintegration in the long run. 
Second, developments and learning in IP management impact economic 
organization, most likely towards increased use of different types of quasi-
integrated organizational forms. This is at least likely in the nearest future, spurred 
by various open innovation initiatives in which quasi-integrated IP management 
skills will be developed, not the least from learning-by-doing. Third, 
developments and learning in IP contracting and law will impact possibilities for 
quasi-integration. Private ownership as well as ownership transfers are since long 
well established institutions and related to integration (hierarchy) and trade 
(market). It is therefore likely that developments in the contractual and legal area 
will rather improve the relative efficiency of quasi-integrated organizational 
forms, as illustrated by co-ownership structures, JVs, licensing and cross-licensing 
schemes, etc. As new contracts are standardized, and possibly also automated, 
transaction costs will decrease. While the effects of technological developments 
on economic organization are difficult to forecast, a hypothesis forwarded here is 
thus that IP management innovations and IP contract innovations will lead to 
relatively more efficient and more use of quasi-integrated organizational forms. 
This, in turn, will lead to increased innovativeness at large due to, for example, 
increased combinatorial possibilities of resources. 
This section is now concluded by returning to the two trends underlying this 
thesis, i.e., the increased use and importance of patents in the pro-patent era and 
                                                 
 
42 At this point, it should be clear that IP management is much more than patent management in 
specialized patent departments, although the latter is of course an important function for IP and 
general management, also in cases of distributed IP management, as in a corporate patent culture 
where patenting is a concern for all engineers. 
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the increased focus on open (and collaborative) innovation (see chapter 2.3). In 
such an environment, IP management and IP contracting become key issues for 
handling interorganizational technology relationships (including both IP control 
and IP value sharing issues). A firm’s network competence, i.e., the “ability to 
handle, use, and exploit interorganizational relationships” (Ritter & Gemünden, 
2003, p. 745), is thus dependent on its IP management and IP contracting 
competences. The fact that network competence impacts both the extent of 
technological collaborations across firms and innovation success positively (ibid.) 
then supports the above hypothesis that IP management and contracting skills will 
foster quasi-integration and thereby innovativeness. 
6.4 Implications for management and policy 
The results of this thesis have multiple implications for both management and 
policy. On the management side, SMEs need to at least gain basic insight and 
knowledge about IP issues, while larger firms need to build international IP 
management skills to meet competitive challenges in the (converging) 
international business landscape with increasing IP encounters. Especially, 
interorganizational IP management skills useful for different forms of open 
innovation are needed. Contractual developments and value sharing principles are 
then useful for enabling interorganizational technological relationships and quasi-
integration, which will likely enable increased innovativeness and firm success. 
This thesis contributes to this area by providing a number of different 
frameworks, models, and tools (Papers IV-VI).  
Considering the importance of technologies for contemporary businesses, and the 
importance of IP for managing the control of and access to the technology base of 
the firm, strategic IP management is a central issue for all technology-based firms. 
IP management has long-term effects on corporate strategies and future business 
opportunities, not the least due to the lifetimes of patents, trade secrecy rights, 
copyrights, trademarks, and other IPRs. Top management should recognize this 
fact and integrate IP management with technology/innovation management and 
general corporate management.  
When it comes to open innovation, multiple dimensions of openness can be 
managed to foster the technical, commercial, and economic success of firms 
(Paper IV). Rather than “opening up” their innovation processes in general, firms 
should consider these dimensions and evaluate what combination of different 
types of openness that suit them, and develop IP strategies accordingly. Any open 
innovation activity might then eventually be subject to terminations or exits. 
Therefore, management must consider the IP disassembly problem at an early 
stage, since subsequent exit opportunities can be strictly limited if the problem is 
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mismanaged. This necessity seems not to be sufficiently attended to by the many 
promoters of open innovation. 
On the legal institutional level, uncertainties can and should be decreased in order 
to mitigate opportunism and transaction costs. Such uncertainties may relate to 
validity of patents, ownership of IP, damage and license calculations, etc. It is 
therefore of importance that courts enable transparency, leading to improved 
predictability and decreased uncertainty. Currently, many IP court cases are 
subject to record sealing, meaning that (at least part of) the case documentation 
remains confidential, typically due to requests from the involved parties. Due to 
this and the fact that settlements are common and typically not published, a large 
share of court cases lack transparency of value to learning by third parties. 
Especially the field of IP pricing and value sharing would benefit from increased 
transparency. Fairness principles established by courts could then diffuse on the 
market and be implemented in negotiations and treaties; leading to lower 
transaction costs, including fewer cases ending up in court. It is then of course of 
utmost importance that courts employ methods and models based on sound 
economic rationales. Thus, the dismissal of the 25% rule of thumb by the US 
CAFC in 2011 was a step in the right direction (Paper V). 
Additionally, since IP negotiations are costly it is important for policy to properly 
design the system to avoid “over-propertization” and tragedies of the 
anticommons. Especially SMEs have navigation problems with a decreasingly 
maneuverable IPR landscape (Paper II), although it raises problems for large firms 
as well. Actions to “raise the bar” in terms of inventive step requirements for 
patentability can be mentioned as just one example of legal actions that can 
mitigate some of these problems. 
Finally, the internationalization and market convergence of patenting (Papers I 
and III) lead to decreased importance for PTOs in small nations, such as the 
Swedish PTO. This in turn has implications for domestic patent consultancy 
industries, since they are typically oriented towards the national PTOs regarding 
legal competence, language preferences, etc. Both national PTOs and patent 
consultancy firms need to adapt to this changing patenting landscape. 
6.5 Directions for future research 
This thesis has pointed at the intertwined processes of on one hand managing 
intellectual property and on the other hand managing innovation in general and 
more specifically managing innovation openness (ranging from “closed” to 
“open” in some sense). A one-dimensional view of innovation openness is overly 
simplistic, and this thesis (Paper IV) provides researchers with a multi-
dimensional framework that is possible to operationalize and that incorporates 
some of the most important issues for innovation openness. Precise assessments of 
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“degree of openness” or quasi-integration on one hand and technical and 
economic performance on the other hand are by and large absent (with some 
exceptions). More research is thus needed, including more research on how IP 
should be managed with increasing interorganizational technological relationships 
of various forms, in light of the probably industry and technology specific links 
between openness and techno-economic performance. 
This leads to the importance of advancements in interorganizational IP 
governance. As argued above, developments are needed both on the contractual 
side and on the pricing side. Future research should develop new contractual 
solutions and IP pricing and value sharing principles. This thesis has made a 
couple of contributions to this area (Papers V and VI). However, further 
developments and more research is needed, and scholars, practitioners, and courts 
must continuously contribute to institutional and contractual innovations to 
mitigate transaction costs. 
IP management and policy issues might then need to be addressed individually for 
specific technological areas, industries, and types of firms. For example, the area 
of IPR issues in an environmental and sustainability context is especially 
interesting, incorporating problems with both impure public goods (technologies) 
and common goods (natural resources). Transaction costs, hold-ups, and 
opportunistic behavior might have especially severe consequences in this area, 
inhibiting the diffusion of environmental technologies. Researchers should take a 
proactive role in mitigating this. A second important area is how the IP system 
and innovation and IP policies can be altered to decrease the relative disadvantage 
for SMEs (Paper II). This is not limited to changes in law and court practices, but 
also includes awareness and teaching campaigns, financial support, external 
advisors, etc. Research is then needed on how such modifications and systems 
should be designed.43 
Internationalized and converging patenting will likely lead to a concentration of 
patenting, patents, and related issues (such as infringement cases and licensing 
deals) to certain nation markets (Papers I and III). This relates to a number of 
questions open for further research. Which nation markets will rise as the 
dominant IP nation markets (if any, market convergence might eventually slow 
down and even change direction, even though the latter is unlikely)? How will this 
affect institutions and management in these and other nations? 
A final suggestion relates to the use of patent statistics in general R&D and 
innovation studies. Patents are commonly used to measure the inventive 
                                                 
 
43 See SOU (2006) for suggestions in this area. 
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productivity of firms and nations. The results of this study contain a number of 
reasons to question the validity of this measure. There is indeed a relation between 
invention production and the number of patents (of which many if not most are 
never commercialized), but due to differences in IP strategies over nations, 
industries, firms, and time, this relation is not easy to assess. Any results obtained 
from patent data must therefore be analyzed with great care before drawing 
conclusions for innovativeness and R&D productivity. 
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7 Conclusions 
This thesis has dealt with the field of strategic management and economics of 
technological IP. This field has been of growing importance among practitioners 
and (later) researchers alike since the advent of the pro-patent era in the 1980s. 
This era originated by and large as a result of macro level policy changes in the 
US, in turn gradually leading to broad-based changes in micro level firm 
strategies and increased importance of IP for businesses around the world. In 
addition, the field has become increasingly important in the management of 
various types of open innovation processes, leading to new requirements on the 
management of technological IP. This thesis has contributed to this field, with the 
purposes (1) to explore and explain strategic and innovation related intellectual 
property management practices and their consequences, and (2) to develop 
managerial and economic frameworks, models, and tools to be used in the 
intersection between intellectual property management and open innovation 
practices. 
These purposes have been addressed in this cover part and in six appended papers. 
The papers can be structured and matched according to their relevance for 
different elements of the strategic IP management concept, all in all relating to the 
acquisition of IP, the governance of IP, and the exploitation of IP. These elements, 
in turn, can be related to different degrees of organizational integration, indicating 
the close link between the field of IP management and theories of the firm, and 
between IP management and innovation openness. 
The thesis shows that large firms have shifted focus from quantity-oriented to 
more selective and quality-oriented patenting and that IP management practices 
have become internationalized. Results suggest that not only IPR laws tend to 
converge internationally, but also IP management practices, for instance in terms 
of output markets for patenting and to some extent the technological areas that are 
patented. Although convergences in IP management practices on a general level 
can be identified, the IP management skills of SMEs seem to have fallen behind 
those of large firms, not the least due to limited resources for acquiring, 
monitoring, and enforcing IPRs. 
The convergence in market and technology selections, in combination with an 
increasing importance of IP in general, will likely lead to an increasing number of 
IP-based business encounters, be they litigation-related, licensing-related, or 
something else. In combination with the use of different forms of open innovation, 
this puts increasing emphasis on interorganizational IP management skills to 
improve the governance of technologies and open innovation systems and to 
decrease transaction costs. IP management is then not (and has never been) only 
about maximizing excludability, and strategic IP management must therefore be 
integrated with corporate management, strategies, and business models. A 
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consequence is that IP management responsibilities cannot be limited to specialist 
departments, such as patent departments, but must be distributed across all 
relevant functions of the firm.44 
In order to mitigate transaction costs in connection to interorganizational and 
technological relationships this thesis argues for the need of new IP contracts on 
one hand and new IP pricing and value sharing (fairness) principles and models 
on the other hand. On the contractual side, the thesis provides a framework with 
contractual combinations suitable for managing the IP disassembly problem. On 
the pricing and value sharing side, an investment-based method for FRAND 
royalty determination is provided as a promising tool for enabling fairness in 
licensing deals. Further developments in this area are needed, however, and not 
only in terms of new contracts and new value sharing principles (as separates), but 
also in terms of matching contracts with valuation and fairness principles. 
With increasing learning and developments in IP management skills in general, 
and contracting, pricing, and valuation skills more specifically, it is likely that the 
transaction costs related to quasi-integrated organizational forms will decrease, 
leading to an increased use of these forms of organization (everything else – e.g., 
technology – equal). By enabling new resource combinations, interorganizational 
technological relationships and quasi-integration will, in turn, have a positive 
impact on innovativeness.  
Learning and developments in IP management are therefore conducive for 
economic growth and welfare developments, despite a possible parallel 
emergence of new types of abuse and opportunism. Thus, scholars and 
practitioners, as well as courts, should aim for developing and diffusing new and 
useful IP management practices and IP contracts. Despite the fact that these types 
of innovations are typically not of technical character, and probably not 
patentable, they might very well be the most important types of innovations for 
future technological developments.  
 
 
                                                 
 
44 This does not mean that there should be no IPR-related specialist departments. These are most 
probably necessary to enable economies of scale and cross-fertilization across units, divisions, etc. 
However, the responsibilities for strategic IP management on a general level should not be limited 
to such a department, but should rather be distributed to engage all relevant functions, in turn 
interacting with any available specialist departments. 
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